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RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF LEGAL INTERESTS
IN MICHIGAN PROPERTY: II*
William F. Fratchert

IV.

RESTRAINTS ON PossEssoRY EsTATEs FOR LIFE

"Estate for life" is a generic term embracing interests in land of
several types. The duration of such an estate may be measured by the
life of the tenant himself, by the life of some other person, by the
joint lives of a group of persons (i.e., the-life of the member of the
group who first dies), or by the life of the survivor of a group of persons. In the last two cases the tenant himself may or may not be a
member of the group. When the duration of the estate is measured by
the life of someone other than the tenant, that person is known as the
cestui que vie and the estate as one pur autre vie. An estate for life may
arise by operation of law, as in the case of dower, curtesy and tenancy in
tail after possibility of issue extinct, or it may be created by express
limitation or implication in a conveyance or devise. A conveyance
creating a life estate may form part of a family settlement, it may be an
outright sale, or it may be a commercial lease, reserving rent and differing from an estate for years only in that duration is measured in lives.
The incidents of these several types of estate for life are not precisely
uniform but, for most present purposes, they may be considered together. 234
As has been seen, opposition to the alienability of estates in fee
simple arose from three sources, the owner's feudal overlord, his tenant
and his heir. As an estate for life is not an estate of inheritance, the
heir could have no serious opposition to its alienation.235 Tenants of life
tenants have only a slight interest. Alienation of a life estate would
* Part I was published in 50 MicH, L. REv. 675 (1952).-Ed.
t Member, Michigan Bar; Professor of Law, University of Missouri.-Ed.
284 I CoKB, INsnTUTEs 4Ib-42b; CHALLis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 339-348,
356-363 (19II); PLUCXNE'IT, CoNcrsE HisTORY oF THE COMMON LAw 363-364 (1929).
235 If an estate pur autre -uie was limited to a tenant and his heirs, the heir was entitled to it as special occupant after the death of the tenant. CHALLJs, REAL PROPERTY, 3d
ed., 358 (19II). Such a right is, however, trivial compared with a right to inherit in fee
simple or tail.
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rarely interfere with the most valuable of the feudal overlord's incidents
of tenure, wardship, marriage and escheat. There was probably little
opposition to the alienability of life estates and it was unnecessary to
provide for it by statute. The common law seems alw,ays to have recognized the power of a tenant for life to make an inter vivos transfer of
his estate. 236 It will be recalled that freehold estates were not transmissible by will at common law237 and the Statute of Wills of 1540 did
not empower the tenant pur autre vie to devise his estate.238 He could,
however, accomplish nearly the same result by making a lease to commence at his death239 and power to transmit estates pur autre vie by
will was conferred by statute in 1676.240 Strictly speaking, a life estate
was not heritable but, if limited to the tenant and his heirs, or to him
and the heirs of his body, the heir took upon intestacy as special occupant.241
As in the case of the fee simple, the English common law did not
permit the creation of an inalienable life estate. A restraint on alienation by way of prohibition, which would force the life tenant to remain
such against his will, was both impossible and void. It was impossible
because the life tenant could always destroy his estate by making a
tortious conveyance in fee or committing waste. 242 It has been seen
that entailment is essentially the designation of a peculiar course of
descent coupled with a prohibition on alienation. Entailment of an
estate pur autre vie was effective as a designation of the special occupant but wholly ineffective as a prohibition on alienation. The life
236 Anonymous, Liber Assissarum, 27 Edw. ill, pl. 31 (1353); Utty Dale's Case, Cro.
Eliz. 182, 78 Eng. Rep. 439 (1590); 1 CoKl!, lNsn-rtITlls 41b; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HrsTORY
oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 123 (1923).
231 2 PoLLocK AND MArn.AND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw BEFoRB nm TIMB oF
EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895); note 8 supra.
238 Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540) as explained by Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5, §3
(1542); 1 CoKl!, lNsn-ruTEs lllb (Hargrave's Note No. 141 to 13th ed. 1787).
2 39 Barwick's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b, 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 199 at 201 (1598).
240 Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, §12 (1676), explained by Stat. 14 Geo. II, c.
20, §9 (1741). The latter statute provided that, when an estate pur autre vie was not
disposed of by will and there was no special occupant (i.e., the estate was limited to the
deceased tenant without mention of his heirs), it should be distributed as personal property
of the deceased tenant.
241 Note 235 supra.
242Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628) (feolfment in fee);
Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 5, 7 (1278) (waste; tortious conveyance by dowress);
2 CoKl!, lNsTITtJT.Es 309. There were several other ways in which a tenant for life could
divest himself of his estate by forfeiture. l CRUISE, DIGEST OF THE LAws oF ENGLAND
REsPECTING REAL PROPERTY *112-*114. The Michigan statutes provide that a conveyance
of the fee by a life tenant shall not work a forfeiture of his estate [Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 65,
§4; Comp. Laws (1857) §2723; Comp. Laws (1871) §4206; How. Stat., §5654; Comp.
Laws (1897) §8958; Comp. Laws (1915) §11690; Comp. Laws (1929) §13280; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §26.523; Comp. Laws (1948) §565.4] and probably eliminate forfeiture for
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tenant could bar the entail by the ordinary forms of inter vivos conveyance and possibly by will. 243 That a prohibition on alienation in a
conveyance of an estate for life is void is well settled in England244 and
is the prevailing view in this country. 245
The position of the English common law as to the validity of a
penalty restraint on alienation of a legal estate for life is not so certain.
At common law a conveyance by a life tenant of a greater estate than
he had, forfeited his estate and destroyed reversions and remainders
expectant upon it. There is dictum in a fifteenth century opinion that
a condition against alienating in fee may be imposed upon a life
estate.246 This is, no doubt, sound because, as has been seen, tortious
alienation may always be restrained by penalty. The two grounds upon
which the fourteenth and fifteenth century judges ruled that penalty
restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple were void, that the statute Quia Emptores T errarum conferred an inseparable incident of
alienability upon every estate in fee simple and prohibited a reversion
or remainder following such an estate,247 have no application to estates
for life. The statute did not apply to life estates and they may, indeed
must, be followed by a reversion or remainder. The stress laid upon the
existence of a reversion or remainder in the cases holding valid penalty
restraints on alienation of estates in fee tail and for years248 suggests
waste [Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 110, §6; Comp. Laws (1857) §4703; Comp. Laws (1871)
§6358; How. Stat., §7945; Comp. Laws (1897) §11121; Comp. Laws (1915) §14945;
Comp. Laws (1929) §15120; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2146; Comp. Laws (1948) §690.406].
They recognize, however, that life estates may be destroyed by disseisin, forfeiture, surrender or merger. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §32; Comp. Laws (1857) §2616; Comp. Laws
(1871) §4099; Comp. Laws (1897) §8814; How. Stat., §5548; Comp. Laws (1915)
§11550; Comp. Laws (1929) §12952; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.32; Comp. Laws (1948)
§554.32. See note 263 infra.
243 Doe ex dem. Blake v. Luxton, 6 T.R. 289, 101 Eng. Rep. 558 (1795); 1 CRmsE,
llicEsT oP THE LAws oP ENGLAND REsPECI'ING REAL PROPERTY "'106-*108; CHALus,
LAw oP REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 362-363 (1911).
244 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811); Graves v. Dolphin,
1 Sim. 66, 57 Eng. Rep. 503 (1826); see Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare 475 at 482, 68
Eng. Rep. 597 (1852). These cases involved equitable life estates but the rule applies
with greater force to legal life estates. Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv.
236 at 244 (1917).
245 The cases are collected in GRAY, REsTRAINTs ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 134-277
(1895); Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv.
L. REv. 373 at 394-398 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal
Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1208 (1935). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATBMBNT
§405 (1944).
246 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494). See notes 242 supra and
263 infra.
247Notes 114, 115 supra.
248 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII,
Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous,
Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9 (1498); Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. Rep. 97

796

M1cHIGAN LAw REvrnw

[ Vol. 50

the validity of such restraints on life estates. The reversioner or remainderman whose estate follows a life estate has a greater interest in the
personal characteristics of the life tenant than have reversioners and
re~aindermen whose interests succeed estates tail or long terms of
years. Professor John Chipman Gray thought that penalty restraints
on alienation of legal estates for life were valid under the English
common law but, with one exception, the cases he cited in support of
this proposition involved equitable life estates.249 There are nineteenth
century English cases which assume the validity of such a restraint on
a legal estate for life. 250 Although the rule as to equitable life estates
is probably otherwise,251 it would seem that th~ English law permits
such restraints on legal estates only if they benefit the reversion or
remainder and that they are void if solely for the protection of the life
tenant himself or of a stranger to the title to the land involved.252
The American cases tend, like the English, to hold valid a provision
in a conveyance creating an estate for life for forfeiture of the estate
upon alienation, voluntary or involuntary, although there are a few
cases holding such provisions invalid and a few holding, illogically, a provision for forfeiture to someone other than the creator of the estate valid
but one for forfeiture to the creator of the estate void. 253 The Restate(1539); Newis v. Lark, 2 Plow. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 (1571); Earl of Arundel's Case,
3 Dyer 342b, 73 Eng. Rep. 771 (1575); Croker v. Trevethin, Cro. Eliz. 35, 78 Eng. Rep.
301 (1584); Ruddall v. Miller, 1 Leon. 298, 74 Eng. Rep. 271 (1586); Arton v. Hare,
Poph. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 (1595); Sharington v. Minors, Moore K.B. 543, 72 Eng.
Rep. 746 (1599); Anonymous, 1 Brown!. & Golds. 44, 123 Eng. Rep. 655 (1616); Muschamp v. Bluet, J. Bridg. 132, 123 Eng. Rep. 1253 (1617); Crusoe ex dem. Blencowe v.
Bugby, 3 Wils. K.B. 234, 95 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1771); Roe ex dem. Hunter v. Galliers, 2
T.R. 133, 100 Eng. Rep. 72 (1787); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101
Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798). Lord Kenyon's opinion in the last case seems to approve all penalty restraints on alienation except those on estates in fee simple and on barring an, entail
by common recovery or statutory fine. Id. at 61.
249 RllsTRAINTS ON AuENATION, 2d ed., 72-73 (1895). As Gray pointed out, the
ratio decidendi of the first case holding valid a penalty restraint on alienation of an equitable life estate, Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (1733), is the
analogy to restraints in leases for years. This reasoning is equally applicable to a legal life
estate. The one exception is the first case cited in note 250 infra.
250 Craven v. Brady, L.R. 4 Eq. 209 (1867); Blackman v. Fysh, [1892] 3 Ch. 209
(Ct. App.).
251 Re Mair, Williamson v. French, [1909] 2 Ch. 280.
252 Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. Rllv. 236 at 244 (1917); Bordwell,
"Alienability and Perpetuities," 23 lowA L. Rllv. 1 at 11-13 (1938). This conclusion
seems inevitable from the principles upon which the cases referred to in notes 247 and 248,
supra, are grounded.
253 The cases are collected in GRAY, RllsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 72-89
(1895); Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARV.
L. Rllv. 373 at 394-398 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Inter•
ests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1207-1211 (1935).
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ment of Property takes the position that a provision in a conveyance of
a life estate for forfeiture upon alienation is valid whether the forfeiture
is to the creator of the estate or another. 254 So far it reflects settled
English law. The Restatement goes beyond this, however, by asserting
the validity of penalty restraints on alienation of estates for life which
are not imposed for the benefit of the reversioner or remainderrnan.
Thus it declares that a life tenant may provide validly in a conveyance
of his entire estate that the transferee will forfeit the estate by alienation. 255 Such a provision violates the rule implicit in the English cases
that a valid restraint upon alienation of a legal estate may be imposed
only by the creator of the estate for the benefit of his reversion or of a
remainder limited after the estate. Although it does not explicitly so
state, the Restatement would appear to consider valid a contract against
alienation entered into between a life tenant and a stranger to the title,
such as a neighboring proprietor. These extensions of the rules governing the validity of restraints on alienation of legal life estates seem
inconsistent in principle with the doctrine of estates upon which our
land law is founded. 256
In general, the Michigan statutes recognize legal life estates and
accord to them the incidents which they had at common law. From
1847 to 1949 there were some statutory provisions which made important changes in the common law of estates for life and there are still
254 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §409, illustrations 1, 6 (1944).
25 5 Id., illustration 3. Comment a says, "Normally the objective

sought to be accomplished by the imposition of a restraint on the alienation of an estate for life is the protection
of the life tenant against his own indiscretions. This worthy objective is one which ought to
be effectuated where to do so does not encounter any substantial social objection .•••" This
was not the normal objective sought to be accomplished by such a restraint in the period
during which the incidents of legal life estates became fixed. 7 HOLDSWORTH, HrsTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 240-241 (1926). The normal objective in that period was the protection of
the reversioner against having his land and buildings injured by an evil or incompetent
tenant and it was the worthiness of this objective which led to decisions that restraints on
alienation of life estates were valid. The preface to the second edition of Gray's REsTRAINTS
ON Ar.mNATION (1895) is a forceful refutation of the view that "the protection of the life
tenant against his own indiscretion" is a "worthy objective." As he points out, the placing
of an owner of property of full age and sound mind under a sort of guardianship to ensure
that his wrongdoing will injure only others and not himself is likely to weaken his character and harm society. Despite Gray's vigorous objections the objective of protecting the
owner has been recognized as a proper basis for restraints on alienation of interests under
trusts. This is no reason for extending such recognition to legal estates. As Mr. Manning
has observed, the legal life tenant who is in possession of the land, is much more likely to
secure credit on the basis of his apparent power of alienation than is the beneficiary under
a trust of land in the possession of a trustee. Manning, "The Development of Restraints
on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. L. REv. 373 at 398 (1935).
256 2 SxMEs, LAw oF FUTCII\E INTERESTS 310 (1936).
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some provisions which have a bearing on the validity and effect of
restraints on alienation of such estates. 251

St. Amour v. Rivard258 was a suit to construe ·a will which was
executed in 1837 and became effective upon the death of the testator
in I 841. After devising life estates in land to nine persons, the will
provided,
"Every single disposal of real estate made in this my testament,
is only for the use and benefit of him or her in whose favor it is
made, his or her Zife lasting, and that it is my formal will that
neither my real estate nor any parcel thereof, will ever be sold or
2 57 Chapter

62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided as follows:
"Sec. 5. Estates ..• for life shall be denominated estates of freehold; ...
"Sec. 6. An estate for the life of a third person, whether limited to heirs or otherwise, shall be deemed a freehold only during the life of the grantee of devisee, but after
his death it shall be deemed a chattel real.
"Sec. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be limited unless to persons in being
at the creation thereof; and when a remainder shall be limited on more than two (2)
successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the two (2) persons
first entitled thereto, shall be void, and upon the death of these persons, the remainder shall
take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estate had been created.
"Sec. 18. No remainder shall be created upon an estate for the life of any other
person or persons than the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such remainder be in
fee; nor shall any remainder be created upon such an estate in a term for years, unless it
be for the whole residue of the term.
"Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon any such life estate, and more
than two (2) persons shall be named as the persons during whose lives the estate shall
continue, the remainder shall take effect upon the death of the two (2) persons first named,
in the same manner, as if no other lives had been introduced.
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a term of years, except
to a person in being at the creation of such estate.
"Sec. 24. Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections of this chapter, a
freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be created to commence at a future day, an
estate for life may be created in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon.
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which, in case it should
happen, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate; and every such remainder
shall be construed a conditional limitation and shall have the same effect as such a limitation would have by law.
"Sec. 29. When a remainder on an estate for life, or for years, shall not be limited
on a contingency, defeating or avoiding such precedent estate, it shall be construed as
intended to take effect only on the death of the first taker, or the expiration, by lapse of
time, of such term of years."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2589, 2590, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2605,
2608, 2611, 2613; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4072, 4073, 4084, 4085, 4086, 4088, 4091,
4094, 4096; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8787, 8788, 8799, 8800, 8801, 8803, 8806, 8809,
8811; How. Stat., §§5521, 5522, 5533, 5534, 5535, 5537, 5540, 5543, 5545; Comp. Laws
(1915) §§11523, 11524, 11535, 11536, 11537, II539, 11542, II545, 11547; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§12925, 12926, 12937, 12938, 12939, 12941, 12944, 12947, 12949; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§26.5, 26.6, 26.17, 26.18, 26.19, 26.21, 26.24, 26.27, 26.29; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§554.5, 554.6, 554.17, 554.18, 554.19, 554.21, 554.24, 554.27, 554.29. Sections 17, 18 and 19 were repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49(2);
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52, as to conveyances executed and wills becoming effective
after September 23, 1949.
25s 2 Mich. 294 (1852).
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alienated in whatsoever manner-but that after the decease of
those several to which shares or parcels of my real estate have been
assigned, the said shares or parcels will remain for the use and
benefit of the descendants of him or her to whom a shares [sic]
has been assigned, their lives lasting, and so on, and in case of
demise without posterity, the said share will accrue to the use and
hene-fit of the owner or of the owners being of my relation or
descendants, their life lasting, of the next share or shares, and so
on as long as any posterity will exist, and in case of extinction to
the next heirs."
The named devisees, who were also some of the heirs at law of the
testator, conveyed their interests to the plaintiff, who sought a determination that the will was void in toto and that he was entitled to partition. The court decided that the will was designed to set up a perpetual succession of inalienable life estates. Rejecting a suggestion of
counsel that the testator's intention could be carried out in part by
ruling that the named devisees took estates for life with remainders in
fee simple to their heirs, the court held that the entire will was void
under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, in force in Michigan
before 1847 and since 1949. Consequently the heirs of the testator
took the land in fee simple, free of the prohibition on alienation imposed by the will. 259
Hayward v. Kinney 200 was a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by
Francis H. Strong in November 1866. In June 1866, when Francis
H. Strong, Joseph T. Strong, Chester W. Strong and Gertrude J. Cole
were tenants in common in fee simple of the land, the last three united
in a quit-claim deed to Francis H. Strong, "during his natural life-time,
and his heirs and assigns of his heirs, forever, but not to be conveyed
during the life-time of the said Francis H. Strong."
The defendant Kinney, a purchaser on execution sale against Francis H. Strong, contended that the quoted language imposed an effective
259 It may be that such a perpetual succession of life estates should be held void under
the ancient common law rule that a remainder may not be limited to the unborn child of
an unborn person, rather than under the more recently developed Rule Against Perpetuities. See Whitby v. Mitchell, L.R. 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890); I FEARNB, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 251, 565 (Butler's note) (1844); Sir Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co.
Rep. 50a at 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527 at 530 (1597); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 25 IowA L. REv. I at 9-22 (1939). This is known variously as the old rule against
perpetuities, the rule against double possibilities and the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell. But
see 2 Sn.ms, LAw OP FaTURE INTERESTS 339-341 (1936). In any event, the result reached
in St. Amour v. Rivard seems sound. S1MEs, id., 428-429.
200 84 Mich. 591, 48 N.W. 170 (1891).
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prohibition on alienation of the life estate in three quarters of the land
conveyed by the deed, so as to make voluntary conveyance or mortgage by Francis H. Strong ineffective. The court rejected this contention, saying,
"These words, if effectual for any purpose, operate, and were
evidently intended, as a condition subsequent. The deed created
a life-estate merely in three-fourths of the premises, and the insertion of the words served to make that an express condition which
at common law was implied in every estate for life or years. 2 Bl.
Comm. 153. Such a condition, however, defeats the estate to
which it is annexed only at the election of him who has a right to
enforce it."261

a

The decision construes language of prohibition as a condition imposing a penalty restraint of forfeiture on alienation. As the cited
passage in Blackstone relates to the common law rule that a conveyance
in fee by a life tenant forfeited his estate, it would seem that the court
thought the condition was only against tortious alienation of the fee,
not against mere alienation of the life estate itself. 262 If so, the validity
of the condition is supported by ancient authority. 263 The case does
not, then, decide whether a restraint on alienation of a life estate, by
prohibition or penalty, is valid.
Lariverre v. Rains2 64 was a suit to quiet title brought by Peter
Lariverre and Joseph Lariverre, Jr. In 1883 Julia L. White executed
an instrument which was, in effect, a covenant to stand seized, conveying to her husband, Edward, "the use and occupancy as long as he shall
live, in case he lives with her as long as she shall live, and sees fit to
occupy the same as a residence and home" the west half of the tract of
Id. at 599.
Note 242 supra.
Note 246 supra. At common law a conveyance by a life tenant of a greater estate
than he had, by feoffment, £ne or recovery, forfeited his estate, destroyed contingent remainders dependent upon it and complicated the enforcement of reversions and vested
remainders. Until 1540, his suffering a common recovery barred even reversions and vested
remainders. Stats. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 31 (1540); 14 Eliz., c. 8 (1572); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 lowA L. RBv. 1 at 57-58 (1938); 25 lowA L. RBv. 1 at 24
(1939). Such a conveyance by lease and release, bargain and sale or covenant to stand
_seised did not have these effects, however, these being deemed "innocent" ·conveyances which
passed only such estate as the conveyor had. As the innocent types of conveyance were
invented after 1494 and as our statutes make all types of conveyance innocent (note 242
supra) it conld be argued that a penalty restraint upon alienation in fee by a life tenant
should have no greater validity than one upon alienation of the life estate itself. See 4
KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMmu:cAN LAW "'82-84, *427-428; PROPERTY RBsTAT.BMENT
§124, comment e (1936).
204 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897).
261
262
2 63
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land involved. The instrument then conveyed to Joseph Lariverre, Sr.,
son of the donor and father of the plaintiffs, "the use and occupancy
of the east half of [the tract] during his life, providing he sees fit to use
and occupy the same so long as a home and residence," and proceeded
as follows:
"and by these presents conveys absolutely, subject to the above
conditions, all of said [tract of land] to her said grandchildren,
Joseph and Peter Lariverre, children of the said Joseph, her son,
or to his heirs; it being expressly understood that, if her said son
Joseph shall have more children at the time of his death, they
shall share and share alike the said property. It is further understood that in case of her death, and the death of her said husband,
before the death of her said son Joseph, then he, her said son
Joseph, shall have the use and occupancy during his life of [the
whole tract] on the terms and conditions above specified, to wit,
to be used and occupied by him as a home and residence. It being
expressly understood and agreed that the right to use and occupy,
as above stated, is intended to be a life interest, and not transferable so far as the said Edward White and Joseph Lariverre, Sr.,
are concerned."
In 1889 Julia L. White executed a conveyance in fee of the east
half of the tract to her son Joseph Lariverre, Sr. and he executed a like
conveyance to Maria B. Doyle. In the same year Julia L. White and
Edward White executed a conveyance in fee of the west half of the
tract to Maria B. Doyle. Maria B. Doyle took possession of the whole
tract in 1889 and conveyed it to the defendants in 1890. Julia L.
White died while the suit was pending but Edward White and Joseph
Lariverre, Sr., were alive when the case was decided. The court held
that the actions of Edward White and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., in ceasing
to occupy the land and attempting to convey to Maria B. Doyle, terminated their life estates and that the plaintiffs, remaindermen, were
entitled to immediate possession, notwithstanding the fact that the two
life tenants were still alive. The opinion contains no discussion of the
validity of restraints on alienation and cites as authority for the result
reached only Ryder v. Flanders, 265 a case which has little bearing on
the real problems involved.
265 30 Mich. 336 (1874). This case involved a devise to the testator's widow during
the term of her natural life, should she so long remain his widow and unmarried and then
"in either case" to his children. The widow remarried and, after one child had died, joined
with some of the children in a conveyance to the other children. All that was decided was
that the grantees in this deed owned the whole fee which, as the court pointed out, would
be the case whether or not the limitation over on remarriage was valid.
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As it had in Hayward v. Kinney2 66 the court in Lariverre v. Rains
construed language which, taken literally, purported to prohibit alienation, as a provision for forfeiture on alienation. As the provisions of
the instrument relative to occupancy were couched in language of
limitation, this construction was probably sound. The court did not
consider the possible application to that part of the instrument which
concerned the west half of the tract of the Michigan statute then in .
force which invalidated more than two successive life estates.267 Probably the application of. that statute would not have affected the result.
The court also failed to consider the statute, which is still in force, providing that when a remainder on an estate for life shall not be limited
on a contingency, defeating or avoiding the life e$tate, it shall be construed as intended to take effect only on the death of the life tenant. 268
If the latter statute applied to the disposition in Lariverre v. Rains it
would seem that, upon the forfeiture of the estates of Edward White
and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., the land would revert to Julia L. White and
her heirs until the death of Edward and Joseph, Sr. It may be that the
language limiting the remainder to the grandchildren was sufficient to
prevent the operation of the statute; that is, to provide that they should
take whenever and however the life estates were terminated.
Lariverre v. Rains has been cited as something of a leading case in
support of the proposition that penalty restraints on alienation of estates
for life are valid. The opinion throws disappointingly little light on the
problem. The conveyances by the life tenants were in fee so the case
may stand only for the ancient rule that restraints on tortious alienation
are valid. 269 Moreover, the occupancy provisions of the instrument
involved seemed to be given more weight by the court in reaching its
conclusion than the language prohibiting alienation.
Hamilton v. Wickson270 was a suit to enjoin an action of ejectrnent.
In 1870 Norman Hamilton leased 160 acres to John and Adah Hamilton for the life of the survivor, reserving rent of a dollar a year. The
lease provided,
"And it is expressly understood, declared, and agreed by and
between the parties hereto, and these presents are made upon the
express condition, that the term hereby created shall not in any
266 Note 260 supra.
267Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, note 257 supra.
268 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §29, note 257 supra.
269 See notes 246 and 263 supra.
270 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902).
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case be assignable by the said parties of the second part, or either
of them, or by the survivor of them, nor shall the same be taken in
execution, or be mortgaged, pledged, or in any way aliened; and
that in the event of the said term hereby granted and created, or
the said demised premises, being assigned, mortgaged, pledged, or
in any away aliened, sold, or taken, in execution, or the said parties
of the second part, or either of them, or the survivor of them,
becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or in case of the nonperformance
of the covenants aforesaid, that then in either or any of such case
or cases, the said term or estate hereby created or intended so to
be shall immediately cease and determine, and these presents become void, and the said demised premises at once revert to the said
party of the first part, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns,
and he or they be thereupon at liberty to enter upon said demised
premises, either with or without formal demand for possession
thereof, and the same to have again as of his or their forever [sic]
estate, notwithstanding the said parties of the second part, or the
survivor of them, may still be alive, anything herein contained to
the contrary notwithstanding."
Norman Hamilton died in 1874, devising the premises, subject to
the lease, to the defendants pur autre vie, with contingent remainder
to the sons of John Hamilton living at the death of the survivor of John
and Adah Hamilton. In 1888 John and Adah Hamilton executed a
deed purporting to convey a SO-foot strip of the land to a railroad.
John Hamilton died in 1891 and the defendants commenced the action
of ejectment sought to be enjoined against Adah Hamilton, claiming
that the life estate was forfeited by breach of a covenant to repair and
of the condition against alienation. The court reversed a decree which
enjoined prosecution of the action of ejectment, saying, without other
discussion or citation of authority on the restraint on alienation problem, "It seems not to be contested that, if the lease is a subsisting, binding agreement, its covenants have been broken in such manner as to
entitled the remainder-men to re-enter."271
The decision in Hamilton v. Wickson probably supports the propoc;ition that a provision in a conveyance of a life estate that the estate
271 Id.

at 76. The plaintiffs, Adah Hamilton, widow of John, and their children, relied

primarily on a theory of resulting trust arising from the fact that John had paid the consideration for the original conveyance in fee to Norman, made prior to 1860. The court

rejected this theory on the grounds the acceptance of the lease estopped the lessees from
asserting title in fee and that the Michigan statutes have abolished resulting trusts. Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 63, §7; Comp. Laws (1857) §2637; Comp. Laws (1871) §4120; How.
Stat., §5569; Comp. Laws (1897) §8835; Comp. Laws (1915) §11571; Comp. Laws
(1929) §12973; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.57; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.7.
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shall be forfeited to the reversioner upon alienation by the life tenant
is valid. Yet in it, as in the earlier cases, the alienation by the life
tenants was a conveyance in fee. 272 Moreover, the effect of the decision
is much weakened by the fact that it is based in part upon breach of
the covenant to repair. In view of the facts that Norman and John
Hamilton were brothers and that the life lease was, in some sense, a
family settlement, it seems doubtful that the condition against alienation should be construed to forfeit the entire 160 acres upon alienation
of a 50-foot strip. 278
Heinze v. Heinze 214 was an action of assumpsit for use and occupation. The defendant, in consideration of one dollar, gave his mother
a life lease of land providing that the lessee should not sublet without
the written consent of the lessor. The defendant remained in possession and the mother's administrator bn;mght this action after her death.
The court, without discussion of the validity of the provision against
sub-letting, held that consent in writing was not required for a subletting to the lessor himself.
' Hess v. Haas2 75 was a suit to enjoin assertion of a forfeiture of a life
estate. In September 1913 James Hess executed a lease of a farm to the
plaintiff for the term of her life, to commence at his death. The lease
contained a covenant against assignment, transfer or subletting without the written assent of the lessor and a provision for termination and
re-entry by the lessor upon breach of any covenant. James Hess married the plaintiff in November 1913, divorced her in 1917, and died
in 1922, devising the land to the defendants. The plaintiff leased the
farm to one Laskey for a term of three years and the defendants declared
a forfeiture. The circuit court entered a decree for the plaintiff on the
ground that a covenant against alienation of a life estate is void as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. This decree was affirmed on the
ground that the covenant against alienation, which was part of a printed
form of lease, had been inserted by mutual mistake. Three justices
dissented, asserting that Lariverre v. Rains2 16 had held that forfeiture
restraints upon assignment or subletting, inserted for the protection of
the lessor, were valid in leases for life to the same extent as in leases for
years. The majority opinion does not categorically deny this proposition but, by pointing out that the decision in Lariverre v. Rains was
212 See

notes 246 and 263 supra.
278 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §409, comment g.
214195 Mich. 365, 162 N.W. 121 (1917).
275 230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925).
216 Note 264 supra.
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based largely upon the occupancy limitations involved in that case,
throws some doubt upon the assertion of the dissenting justices.
Kemp v. Sutton211 was a suit to construe a will devising land to the
testator's widow and four sons and the survivors and survivor of them
during their natural lives, remainder upon the death of the survivor to
the City of Sault Ste. Marie in fee simple. The will provided,
"I further order and direct as a condition precedent to the
enjoyment, devise and ownership and use of the life estates and
interests herein devised, that each and all of the said devisees
above named are absolutely prohibited, from in any wise selling,
mortgaging or incumbering, in any manner whatever, any part or
portion of the said property above devised to them and each of
them, and upon any violation of the same by any or all of the said
devisees as to the same in this item set out; then I direct that each
devisee or devisees so violating this item shall forfeit the share and
portion herein devised to them and the same shall revert to, and
become the property of the other devisees above mentioned in the
shares and under the terms herein set out in this my will."
The court held that the will gave the individual devisees a single
legal joint life estate for the life of the survivor2 78 and that this disposition did not violate a statute which was in force from 1847 to 1949
providing that the absolute power of alienation should not be suspended
by a limitation, condition or future estate for longer than two lives in
being.279 The opinion does not mention the Michigan statutes then
211 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925).
278 This seems irreconcilable with other decisions

that a conveyance to several persons
as joint tenants and to the survivor creates a joint estate for the life of the first to die, with
remainder to the survivor. Note 167 supra.
279 Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided,
"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the
absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this chapter; such
power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed.
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation
or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of two (2) lives in
being at the creation of the estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next section.
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee,
to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first (1st) remainder is limited
shall die under the age of twenty-one (21) years, or upon any other contingency by which
the estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their full age."-Comp.
Laws (1857) §§2598, 2599, 2600; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4081, 4082, 4083; Comp. Laws
(1897) §§8796, 8797, 8798; How. Stat. §§5530, 5531, 5532; Comp. Laws (1915)
§§11532, 11533, 11534; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12934, 12935, 12936; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§26.14, 26.15, 26.16; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.14, 554.15, 554.16; repealed as to
conveyance executed and wills becoming effective after September 23, 1949 by Act 38,
P.A. 1949, §2; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49(2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52.
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in force which prohibited more than two successive life estates280 and
does not discuss the validity of the quoted provision for forfeiture upon
alienation other than to say that all the life tenants could unite with
the city to convey a fee or release to a purchaser from the city. The
opinion has an important bearing on the validity of restraints on alienation imposed between 1847 and 1949, however, in that it indicates that
such a restraint was not affected by the mentioned statute prohibiting
suspension of the absolute power of alienation so long as persons in
being could unite to convey a fee simple.
· The Michigan law of restraints on alienation of estates for life is
not so certain as that relating to restraints on estates in fee simple. The
denial in Mandlebaum v. McDonell281 of the validity of prohibitions
on alienation, which would operate to force an owner to remain such
against his will, probably extends to all legal estates. None of the cases
involving restraints on life estates contains a thorough discussion of the
problem but it is probable that our law as to penalty restraints is the
same as the English, that is, a provision for forfeiture on alienation in
a conveyance creating a life estate is valid whether the forfeiture is to
the creator of the estate or another. As to inter vivos conveyances, the
statute avoiding conditions which are merely nominal and evince no
intention of actual and substantial benefit to the party in whose favor
they are to be performed must be born in mind. 282 There is certainly
nothing in the Michigan cases to suggest that a restraint imposed for
the benefit of anyone other than a reversioner or remainderman would
be enforced.
The Michigan statutes empower the circuit courts in chancery to
direct the sale of land in fee simple upon petition by a legal life tenant
and a showing that the rights of the interested parties would otherwise
be jeopartlized.283 The statute itself provides that, "No sale or conveyance of any kind shall be made of any property contrary to any specific
provisions in regard thereto contained in the deed of conveyance, or in
the will under which the petitioner holds the said property."284
Accordingly, it would seem that a prohibition on the life tenant's
compelling a sale of the remainder would be valid. The validity of a
280Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§17, 18, 19, note 257 supra.
281 29 Mich. 78 at 83-91 (1874).
282 Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46, notes 143, 145 supra.
283 Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws (1915) §§12716 to 12724;
Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 619.70. This is a reenactment of Act 233, P.A. 1887, as
amended, Comp. Laws (1897) §§9234 to 9242. See PROPERTY RBsTATBMBNT §124, comment i; §179, note (1936).
284 Sec. 70.
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provision in a conveyance creating a life estate for forfeiture of his
estate in the event of the life tenant's filing a petition under the statute
remains undecided. 285

V.

REsTRAINTs ON PossESSORY EsTATEs FOR YEARS

Leases for years were known as early as the twelfth century but
they can scarcely be said to have created estates in land until the latter
part of the fifteenth. Until the third decade of the thirteenth century
the lessee's interest was a purely contractual right, specifically enforceable by means of the action of covenant, against the lessor and the latter's heir. He had no rights at all against the lessor's overlord, persons
to whom the lessor transferred the fee, or strangers. 286 After 1235 the
lessee had a remedy for recovery of possession from a transferee of the
lessor who ejected him. 287 In the early part of the fourteenth century
he acquired a right to maintain an action of trespass for money damages
against a stranger who ousted him288 but he could not recover possession from such a stranger 89 until late in that century. 200
From the fact that the interest of a lessee for years was looked upon
as being in the nature of a chose in action rather than property it might
be assumed that it was inalienable. Such was not the case. From an
early period a term of years was held to be assignable inter vivos291
and, as it was looked upon as a chattel rather than as an estate in land,
it was always transmissible by will. 202 Involuntary alienability of terms
for years was more complete than that of estates in fee and for life.
Whereas, in the case of freehold estates, creditors could not acquire title
but only a right to occupy until their claims were paid,293 a leasehold
estate could be seized and sold outright on execution. 294
285 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT Div. IV, Pt. II, Introductory Note (1944); Cf. id.,
§§428, 437.
286 2 POLLOCK AND MAln.AND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I, 105-117 (1895).
287 Snane v. Rumenal, Bract. N.B., pl. 1140 (1235).
288 Star v. Anonymous, Y.B. 15 Edw. II, Hil., ff. 458, 458b (1321).
289 Anonymous, Y.B. 33 Hen. VI, Mich., pl. 19 (1455).
200 Anonymous, Y.B. 7 Edw. IV, Pasch., pl. 16 (1467); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Edw.
IV, Mich., pl. 2 (1482); 3 HOLDSWORTH, HxsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 213-217
(1923).
201 Fitz Henry v. Utdeners, Bract. N.B., pl. 804 (1233); L:rrrLETON, TENURES §319
(1481).
292 Note 286 supra; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 213-217
(1923).
203 Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 18 (1285).
204Jbid.; G1LllERT, LAw OF Exi;cunoNs 19 (1763); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v.
Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798).
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As in the case of the estate for life, it was practically impossible at
common law to create an inalienable estate for years, one which the
tenant was bound to keep against his will, because a tortious conveyance by the tenant of a greater estate than he held295 or the commission of waste296 forfeited his estate. It is probable that the common law
asserted the nullity of prohibitory restraints on alienation of estates for
years before the era of reported cases. 297 The dearth of English authority on the point indicates that conveyancers always believed that restraints on alienation of leasehold interests by way of prohibition were
void. The American writers and such case law as there is are in accord
with this belief.298
As to penalty restraints, it was decided in 1443 that a condition in
a lease for years that the lessee not grant his estate was valid and entitled the lessor, upon breach, to enter and so terminate the estate for
years. 299 The reason given for the validity of such a restraint was the
protection it afforded to the reversion. It should be noted that the
point was decided at a time when long terms of years were little known,
the rights of a lessee for years were still looked upon as primarily contractual a:µd his interest had not yet attained the status of an estate in
land. Nevertheless, the decision was followed in a number of cases
decided after terms of years had become estates, and terms of five hundred and a thousand years had become common.300 It was later settled
2 95 Metteforde's Case, 3 Dyer 362b, 73 Eng. Rep. 813 (1578); Read v. Erington,
Cro. Eliz. 322, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594). 1 CoKB, lNsTITUTEs 251b, 330a (Butler's Note
No. 285 to 13th ed. 1787).
296 Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278). These rules of forfeiture for the
tenant's voluntary act would not, however, preclude the possibility of an effective prohibition of involuntary alienation.
297 The Statute of Wales, 12 Edw. I, c. IO (1284), which, while applicable only to
Wales, reflects the English common law of the period, prohibited specific enforcement of
covenants against alienation. At this period the term "covenant" was virtually synonymous
. with the later term "lease" and the action of covenant was that used for the specific enforcement of provisions of leases. Foresta v. Villy, Bract. N.B., pl. 1739 (1226); 2 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HisTORY OP ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OP EnwAIU> I, 106
(1895).
·
298 GRAY, REsTRAINTs ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 277 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints
Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1211-1212 (1935).
Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §405 (1944). Professor Schnebly notes, however, that
there are some cases granting specific performance, by way of injunction, of covenants
against alienation in leases, e.g., McEacham v. Colton, [1902] A.C. 104 (Judicial Committee; decided under the provisions of a peculiar statute in force in South Australia).
299 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443), Paston, J., dissenting.
300 Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, 21 Hen. VII,
Hil., pl. 12 (1505); Anonymous, 1 Dyer 6b, 73 Eng. Rep. 15 (1537); Anonymous, 1 Dyer
45a, 73 Eng. Rep. 97 (1539); Earl of Arundel v. Lord Windsor, 1 Dyer 65a, 73 Eng.
Rep. 138 (1549); Anonymous, Moore K.B. 11, pl. 40, 72 Eng. Rep. 405 (1550); Paschall
v. Keterich, 2 Dyer 151b, 73 Eng. Rep. 330 (1557); Anonymous, 3 Leon. 67, 74 Eng.
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that a condition of forfeiture upon involuntary alienation, as by bankruptcy, was likewise valid. 301 The cases evidence, however, a tendency
to put a very narrow construction upon such conditions so that no form
of alienation is a breach unless clearly penalized by the language of
the condition. The validity at common law of a provision in a lease
that the term should be forfeited to someone other than the lessor upon
alienation by the tenant is not clear because of the undeveloped state
of the law of future interests in legal terms for years. If valid at all,
such a gift over would have to be limited so as to take effect, if at all,
within the period of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. 302 It
would seem that a condition of forfeiture upon alienation in an assignment by a lessee of his entire term is void at common law because not
imposed for the benefit of a reversion. 303
The American cases follow the English rule that conditions against
alienation in leases for years are valid. 304 The Restatement of Property
makes a distinction between leases for years which are executed as
commercial transactions and those which are donative in character,
such as terms limited in family settlements.305 As to the former, the
Rep. 545 (1576); Parry v. Herbert, 4 Leon. 5, 74 Eng. Rep. 688 (1576); Moor v. Farrand,
1 Leon. 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 3 (1587); Sir William More's Case, Cro. Eliz. 26, 78 Eng. Rep.
291 (1583); Stewkley v. Butler, Moore K.B. 880, 72 Eng. Rep. 970, sub nom. Stukeley
v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1615); Crusoe ex dem. Blencowe v. Bugby, 3
Wils. K.B. 234, 95 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1771); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57,
101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798). It is noteworthy that two of these cases held the condition
effective to restrain testamentary disposition of the estate. Anonymous, 3 Leon. 67; Parry
v. Herbert, supra. The clearest statement of the rule and its basis is the dictum in Sir
Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a at 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 317 (1605): "So
if a man makes a gift in tail, on condition that he shall not make a lease for his own life,
it is void and repugnant; but if a man makes a lease for life or years, on condition that he
shall not alien or lease the lands, it is good. For at the common law, lessee for life or years
might commit waste, which was ad exhaereditationem of the lessor, and therefore there was
a confidence betwixt the lessor and lessee, and therefore the lessor might restrain the lessee
from aliening or demising to another, in whom perhaps the lessor had not such confidence.
And therefore it is reasonable that when he who has the inheritance makes a lease for life
or years, that he may restrain such particular tenants from aliening or demising for the
benefit of his inheritance."
301 Roe ex dem. Hunter v. Galliers, 2 T.R. 133, 100 Eng. Rep. 72 (1787). But an
ordinary condition against alienation was not construed to penalize involuntary alienation,
Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798).
302 See SIMEs, Ft.ITORE lm-EREsTS §199 (1936). Professor Simes thinks that such a
special limitation would be valid (§466).
303 1 CoKE, lNsTITUTES 223a; Sweet, ''Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236,
238 (n. 3), 244 (1917); GRAY, REsTR.AIN'l's ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 90 (1895); SrMI!s,
FuTtllU! INTERESTS §466. Cf. Doe ex dem. Duke of Norfolk v. Hawke, 2 East 481, 102
Eng. Rep. 453 (1802).
304 Some are collected in Schnebly, ''Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1211 (1935), and SrMI!s, FUTURE lm-EREsTs §466.
305 Sec. 410 (1944). It reads: "A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the
alienation of a legal possessory estate for years is valid if, and only if,
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Restatement affirms the validity of penalty restraints, including forfeiture to either the lessor or another, when imposed for the benefit of the
lessor and not in violation of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. It would permit the assignor of a term to restrain future alienation, even though he retains no reversion, if he remains liable on the
covenants of the lease. As to the latter, the Restatement would impose
the rules which govern restraints on alienation on freehold estates of
like duration, treating any lease which is not limited in duration by
lives in being as governed by the rules applicable to estates in fee simple.
The Constitution of Michigan provides that "No lease or grant of
agricultural land for agricultural purpose for a longer period than I 2
years, reserving any rent or service of any kind, shall be valid."306 Our
statutes give estates for years substantially the same incidents which
they had at common law and codify the law of future interests in and
following estates for years so as to make the rules governing such interests coincide, so far as possible, with the rules which govern like future
interests in and following freehold estates.307 The statutes appear to
(a) the estate for years is created as the result of a business transaction, the requirements of the rule against perpetuities are satisfied and the restraint is
(i) imposed at the time the estate for years is created; or
(ii) agreed to thereafter as a business transaction by the persons who are in the
relationship of landlord and tenant; or
(iii) imposed by the assignor of an existing estate for years who continues liable
for the performance of the tenant's obligations in the lease even after
assignment; or
(b) the estate for years is terminable at the end of any specified life or lives; or
(c) a similar restraint on an otherwise indefeasH,le estate in fee simple would be
valid••••"
306 CoNsT. 1908, Art. XVI, §10. CoNST. 1850, Art. 18, §12, provided, "No lease or
grant hereafter of agricultural land for a longer period than twelve years, reserving any rent
or service of any kind, shall be valid."
307 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, provided:
"Sec. 5.•• estates for years shall be denominated chattels real ....
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term for years, unless the
nature of the contingency upon which it is limited be such that the remainder must vest
in interest, during continuance of not more than 2 lives in being at the creation of such
remainder, or upon the termination thereof.
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a term of years, except
to a person in being at the creation of such estate.
.
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter contained relative to future estates, shall
be construed to apply to limitations of chattels real, as well as of freehold estates, so that
the absolute ownership of a term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than
the absolute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect to a fee. [Cf. §15, note 279
supra.]
"Sec. 24. Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections of this chapter,
a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be created to commence at a future day; an
estate for life may be created in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon.
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which in case it should
happen, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate; and every such remainder
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make it clear that a term of years may be so limited as to pass to someone other than the lessor on the happening of a contingency, provided
there is no violation of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities or
other applicable rules of law.308

In Lee 11. Payne,309 a decision affirming a judgment for the lessor
in an action for waste against an assignee of the lessee, the court said,
"A lessee for years may assign his entire interest in the lease and premises, unless restrained by covenant not to assign without leave of the
landlord, or he may underlet the whole or a part of the premises, for
any less number of years than he himself holds." 310

Copland 11. Parker311 was a proceeding by a lessor to recover possession of the demised premises before the end of the term on the
ground the lessees had breached a covenant, "not to transfer this lease
without the consent of the party of the first part." The report does not
state whether the lease contained an express provision for forfeiture on
breach of covenant. The lessee appears to have let part of the premises
for the whole of the unexpired term. The court, in an oral opinion
held that there had been only a subletting and that an instruction by
the trial court that the covenant extended to both assignment and subletting, was erroneous.
shall be construed a conditional limitation and shall have the same effect as such a limitation would have by law."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2589, 2604, 2605, 2607, 2608, 2611;
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4072, 4087, 4088, 4090, 4091, 4094; How. Stat., §§5521, 5536,
5537, 5539, 5540, 5543; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8787, 8802, 8803, 8805, 8806, 8809;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11523, 11538, 11539, 11541, 11542, 11545; Comp. Laws (1929)
§§12925, 12940, 12941, 12943, 12944, 12947; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.5, 26.20, 26.21,
26.23, 26.24, 26.27; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.5, 554.20, 554.21, 554.23, 554.24, 554.27.
Sections 20 and 23 were repealed, as to conveyances executed and wills becoming effective
after September 23, 1949, by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49(2); Comp.
Laws (1948) §554.52.
308 The repeal in 1949 of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §23, note 307 supra, makes it less
clear than it was before that it is possible to create future interests in legal terms of years.
300 4 Mich. 106 (1856).
810 Id. at 117. In Craig v. Crossman, 209 Mich. 462, 177 N.W. 400 (1920) the
court rejected a contention that a lease without provision against assignment was inalienable, saying that it was ''by nature, assignable." In Patterson v. Butterfield, 244 Mich. 330,
221 N.W. 293 (1928) the court, in answer to an argument that an obligation resting upon
the lessee in a 99-year lease to erect a building precluded his subleasing, said (at 338), "In
the absence of statutory or contractual restrictions, a lessee for years may assign or sublet
his leasehold interest without the lessor's consent or an express provision in the lease giving
him such right••••"
8114 Mich. 660 (1857). The plaintiff was represented by James V. Campbell, later
Chief Justice of Michigan and Dean of the University of Michigan Law School. He contended that there had been an assignment. Counsel on both sides assumed the validity of
the covenant and cited English cases as to its proper construction.
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Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Company312 was an action of ejectment for mining land. The plaintiff claimed under a 99-year lease of
an undivided half of the mining rights given by the owner of the fee
to one Graveraet, who assigned his interest to the plaintiff and another.
The lease contained no provision against assignment by the lessee and
expressly conferred rights on his assigns. The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the ground the lease conveyed only an incorporeal interest which could not be enforced in ejectment and said
that, while the lessee in such a lease may assign the whole to a single
individual or corporation, he may not, because of the nature of the
interest, assign undivided interests to several persons.
Randall v. Chubb 313 was a summary proceeding for possession of
land. The plaintiff leased the land to Stoddard by an instrument which
did not expressly restrain assignment but which obligated the lessee to
work the farm, using the lessor's implements but providing his own
seed, and to deliver a third of the crops to the lessor. Stoddard assigned
his interest to the defendant. The court affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff, saying that such a lease is personal and non-assignable ~md
that an attempt to assign forfeits the lessee's estate.
Leduke v. Barnett:3 14 was a summary proceeding for possession of
land. The plaintiff demised the premises to Sachen by a lease providing that the lessee should not release or assign the lease without the
lessor's consent and that in case of default in performance of any of the
covenants the lessor might reenter. The lessee gave the defendant
permission to use one room for thirty days. The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the ground the plaintiff had failed to prove
that the underletting was without his consent. Although assuming the
validity of the condition, the court doubted whether there had been a
breach, suggesting that a mere license was not a release or assignment.
Walsh v. Martin315 was an action of assumpsit for use and occupation. The plaintiff leased to Shatto for three years from 1877, the lessee
s12 36 Mich. 105 (1877). It is generally held that a profit a prendre in gross may
· not be assigned in parts to different persons, so that each assignee may exercise it separately,
but that it may be assigned to several persons for exercise in common. Earl of Huntington
v. Lord Mountjoy, Moore K.B. 174, 72 Eng. Rep. 513, 1 Cmra, INsTITUTBs 164b (1583);
3 T1FFANY, I.Aw OF REAL PRoPBRTY, 3d ed., §847 (1939).
313 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881). Accord: Lewis v. Sheldon, 103 Mich. 102,
61 N.W. 269 (1894). Cf. Gravenburgh v. McKeough, 117 Mich. 555, 76 N.W. 77
(1898); Vincent v. Crane, 134 Mich. 700, 97 N.W. 34 (1903); Lowe v. Radecke, 204
Mich. 646, 171 N.W. 408 (1919).
314 47 Mich. 158, 10 N.W. 182 (1881).
315 69 Mich. 29, 37 N.W. 40 (1888).
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covenanting not to assign or release without the written consent of the
lessor and the lessor to be entitled to reenter on breach of covenant. In
1879 the parties indorsed on the lease an extension to 1884, "without
altering the conditions thereof." In 1881, in consideration of the lessee's agreement to make improvements, the lessor endorsed on the
lease, "I hereby give Shatto the privilege of occupying the store mentioned in this lease for ten years from 1884, the rent to be the same as
at present." In 1886 Shatto assigned the lease to the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff attempted to raise the rent. The court assumed the
validity of the covenant against assignment in the original lease but
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground the 1881 endorsement was a new lease, to begin in futuro, without any provision against
alienation, so that the assignment was effective against the lessor.
Wertheimer v. Hosmer3 16 was a proceeding in mandamus to compel
dissolution of an injunction. Clark and Lane leased a store to Michell
for four years, to be used for the sale of teas, coffees, spices, and similar
goods, the lease providing that Michell should not sublet or permit the
occupancy by any other party, without the written consent of the lessors. The report does not indicate whether the lease provided expressly
for reentry on breach of covenant. Michell, with the oral consent of
the lessors, sublet the store to Sprague, to be used for the sale of musical instruments and sheet music. Sprague assigned his interest to
William and Max Wertheimer, who began altering the premises for
use as a "misfit-clothing house." Clark and Lane then sued Michell,
Sprague and the Wertheimers in equity and procured ex parte an injunction restraining Michell and Sprague from using the premises for
any purpose except the sale of teas, coffee, spices, similar goods and
musical instruments and restraining the Wertheimers from using or
occupying the store or any part thereof. The court declined to interfere
with this injunction by mandamus. As to the contention of the defendants that the permission to sublet to Sprague terminated the provision
against assignment the court said,
"A covenant not to ·assign or underlet the leased premises without the assent of the lessor is frequently inserted in a lease, and is
regarded as a fair and reasonable covenant. But a license once
given removes the restriction forever, as the condition is treated as
entire, and therefore not capable of being waived or released as to
part; but in order to have that effect it must be such a license as is
contemplated in the lease,-that is, if the lease provides that the
s16

83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890).
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license shall be in writing, an oral license is not good. It is not to
be understood, however, that this written stipulation not to sublet
unless by consent of the lessor, in writing, may not be waived by
an oral agreement.... The agreement to waive the condition as to
Sprague, however, was not a waiver of the condition in the lease
• . . ."817
as to oth er parties.

If the injunction in this case had been limited to enforcement of
the use restriction there could be no doubt of the soundness of the
result. The injunction went farther, however, in that it restrained the
assignees from occupying the premises for any purpose, despite the
fact that the lessors had not elected to declare a forfeiture of the lease
and had indicated their intention of holding the original lessee liable
for rent. The effect of such specific performance of a covenant against
alienation is to make it effective as a prohibition on alienation, forcing
the lessee to remain such against his will. Enforcement of such a prohibition may have seriously undesirable results which mere forfeiture
would not. Although an effective assignment of his lease does not
ordinarily free the lessee from liability to the lessor for performance of
its covenants, it does free him from other types of liability. The owner
of a legal possessory estate in land is commonly personally liable to the
state and its subdivisions for property taxes, bound to perform labor on
the roads, criminally responsible for rnmoval of snow and noxious
,~1eeds, and liable in tort to members of the public for non-repair of
buildings. A tenant whose health or business has failed may be able
to escape pecuniary liability to his lessor by forfeiture of his estate or
bankruptcy but if he is forced by injunction to retain the estate against
his will he cannot escape these public obligations. The effect of such
an injunction in connection with a long-term lease may be to reduce
the tenant to a status of serfdom or peonage in which he is bound to
the land and from which he can escape only by death. 318
317 Id. at 61. At common law a condition against assignment without the permission
of the lessor was destroyed by the giving of permission for a single assignment; that is, the
lessor had no right of entry if the assignee assigned without permission. Dumper's Case,
4 Co. Rep. 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. lllO (1603); see Anonymous, I Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. Rep.
97 (1539); Fox v. Whitchcocke, 2 Bulst. 290, 80 Eng. Rep. ll29 (1614). It would seem,
however, that a covenant against assignment without the permission of the lessor may, by
apt words, be made to run with the land, so that when an assignment is made with permission, the first assignee will be liable in damages for breach of covenant if he reassigns
without permission. Williams v. Earle, L.R. 3 Q.B. 739 (1868).
818 See note 298 supra. If the doctrine of Wertheimer v. Hosmer should be extended
so as to compel the lessee's next of kin, taking on intestacy, to retain the estate, it might
permit the creation of a system of perpetual, hereditary serfdom, without the ameliorating
customs which eased the lot of the mediaeval peasant. One may speculate as to whether
the lessee's great-grandson could break his bond to the land by escape and hiding for a year
and a day.
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Sommers v. Reynolds319 was a summary proceeding for possession
of a hall. The plaintiff demised the hall to the trustees of the Royal
Adelphia Godfrey Conclave No. 131 by a lease which provided that
the lessees should not release, assign or sublet, except for society purposes, without the written consent of the lessor and that the lessor might
reenter upon breach. The Royal Adelphia and Godfrey Conclave were
dissolved and twelve members of the latter formed a Godfrey Club,
which sublet the hall five nights a week to other societies. A judgment
for the defendants was affirmed on the ground the covenant was not
breached by the dissolution or subletting.
Darmstaetter v. Hoffman320 was an action of assumpsit for rent.
Hubbard and King leased a saloon to the plaintiffs, who covenanted to
pay the rent and not to assign or transfer the lease without the written
consent of the lessors. Without obtaining the consent of the lessors,
the plaintiffs assigned the lease to Kudner, and Kudner assigned to the
defendant. The plaintiffs sued for rent which they had not paid to
Hubbard and King. A judgment for them was affirmed, the court
saying that when a lease is properly assigned the assignee is bound to pay
the rent directly to the lessor and the assignor cannot hold the assignee for
rent unless he has first paid it to the lessor. The opinion states that
where, however, there is a covenant against assignment which the lessor
has not waived, the assignee is the assignor's tenant and liable to him
rather than the assignor. The theory of this decision is that the original
lessee could not divest himself of his estate without the consent of the
lessor. If this is so, then a covenant against assignment is effective as
a prohibition on alienation or disabling restraint which forces the lessee
to remain such against his will. The unsoundness and undesirability
of such a view have already been made manifest.
319 103 Mich. 307, 61 N.W. 501 (1894). Cf. Struble v. Community Club, 218
Mich. 604, 188 N.W. 292 (1922).
320 120 Mich. 48, 78 N.W. 1014 (1899). In Smith v. Applebaum, 241 Mich. 493,
217 N.W. 401 (1928), a 99-year lease provided that the lessee might "not sell or assign
this lease and be released from liability thereon" without providing a bond to secure performance of the covenants. The lessee assigned the lease without providing a bond. After
accepting payments of rent from the assignee, the lessor sued the original lessee for rent
which accrued later. The court affirmed a judgment for the lessor, saying that acceptance
of rent "would not establish the fact that the realty company had been substituted as lessee
in the place of the defendant," and that the assignment "in no way changed the relation
of the parties." The result reached is sound, because an assignment does not relieve a
lessee from performance of a covenant to pay rent in the absence of novation. The quoted
language is unfortunate, however, in suggesting that an assignment without permission has
no effect at all. Unless effective prohibitions on alienation are possible such an assignment
does destroy privity of estate and liability based thereon. Cf. Mooradian v. Petroff, 254
Mich. 278, 236 N.W. 780 (1931); Buhl Land Co. v. Franklin Co., 258 Mich. 377, 242
N.W. 772 (1932).
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Marvin v. Hartz:821 was a summary proceeding for possession of
land. The plaintiff demised to Berlin, the lessee covenanting not to
assign, transfer or sublet without the written assent of the lessor and
· the lease providing that the lessor might reenter upon breach of covenant. Berlin assigned to the defendant without the consent of the
lessor. A judgment for the defendant based on a directed verdict was
reversed. This appears to be the only Michigan case in which a condition of forfeiture on alienation in a lease for years was enforced according to its terms.
Crouse v. Michell322 was a suit to foreclose a lien on an estate for
years. Parker leased land to Michell for a term of fifteen years, the
lease providing that the lessee should not assign, transfer or sublet
without the written consent of the lessor and that the lessor might reenter on breach of covenant. Parker, without the consent or knowledge of the lessor, assigned the lease to the plaintiffs as security for a
debt. Later, Parker, with the written consent of the lessor, assigned
the lease to Ives and Sons, who did not know of the prior assignment.
Counsel for the defense contended that a court of equity should not
enforce an assignment of a lease made in violation of its covenants, even
against parties other than the lessor. The court, without deciding
whether this contention is correct, affirmed a decree for the plaintiffs
on the ground that a mortgage of an estate for years or assignment for
security is not a breach of a covenant against assignment. The opinion
contains language to the effect that covenants -against assignment of
leases are not favored and will be strictly construed.
Negaunee Iron Company v. Iron Cliffs Company3 23 was a suit to
quiet title. In 1857, when the lessee had a two-stack furnace on nearby
land, Harvey, in consideration of a lump sum of $25,000, leased 646
acres to the Pioneer Iron Company for 99 years for the purpose of
mining and quarrying ores and marble. The lease, which did not
reserve rent, read, "Provided, it shall not quarry, mine, or remove any
ores on said land except such as it shall actually convert into merchantable iron in its own furnaces or forges .... The rights and easements
above mentioned shall descend to the corporate successors of the party of
the second part, but not to its assigns."
In 1866 the Pioneer Iron Company leased all its lands to the defendant Iron Cliffs Company, which soon after acquired the entire
130 Mich. 26, 89 N.W. 557 (1902).
130 Mich. 347, 90 N.W. 32 (1902).
323134 Mich. 264, 96-N.W. 468 (1903).
321
322
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capital stock of the Pioneer Company. The charter of the Pioneer
Company expired in 1887 but was revived in 1889 under constitutional
and statutory provisions adopted in the latter year. The furnace was dismantled in 1894. The plaintiffs acquired the reversion and used the
land from 1870 to 1900, when the revived Pioneer Iron Company
asserted a right to mine under the 1857 lease. The court affirmed a
decree for the plaintiffs on the ground the lease conveyed only an incorporeal right which was appurtenant to the furnace and was extinguished
by the dismantling of the furnace. Having reached a decision on this
ground, the court declined to consider the validity or effect of the
provision that the lease should not "descend" to assigns of the lessee:
That provision might be construed as either a prohibition on alienation
or a limitation intended to make the estate cease on alienation. The
court agreed, in general, with a contention of the defendants that a
court of equity should not enforce provisions for forfeiture in a lease,
but should leave the lessor to his remedy at law. It pointed out, however, that in this case the reversioners had already effected a forfeiture
by reentry and occupation for thirty years, so that all equity was being
requested to do was to enjoin threatened trespasses.

Wray-Austin Machinery Company v. Flower 24 was a suit for subrogation to the rights of the lessee under a lease. Flower leased to Wray
by an instrument which contained a covenant against assignment but
not against subletting and an express provision for forfeiture on breach.
Wray sublet to the plaintiff for the balance of the term. Wray having
defaulted in payment of rent, Flower served him with a notice to quit,
commenced a summary proceeding for possession before a circuit court
commissioner, and took judgment by default. The statute then in force
· provided that no writ of restitution should issue on such a judgment if
the defendant paid the rent due and double the costs within five days
after entry of judgment.325 The day after the judgment was entered
the plaintiff learned of it and paid the commissioner the rent due and
the exact amount of the costs. Flower refused to accept this money and
commenced proceedings in mandamus to compel issuance of a writ of
824 140 Mich. 452, 103 N.W. 873 (1905). In Ladas v. Psiharis, 241 Mich. 101, 216
N.W. 458 (1927), a lease had been assigned to a partnership with the consent of the
lessor. The lessor secretly gave one of the partners a renewal lease containing a covenant
against assignment without the consent of the lessor. It was held that the other partners
were entitled to share in the lease, not only as against the lessee but as against the lessor
who, under these circumstances, could be compelled to assent to an assignment to the furn.
825 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 123, §26, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) §11177. The
present statute omits the word "double." Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 30, §25, as amended;
Comp. Laws (1915) §13253; Comp. Laws 1929, §14988; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1999;
Comp. Laws (1948) §630.25.
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restitution. The plaintiff then sued Wray and Flower in equity,
claiming that it was equitably entitled to an assignment of the lease
and to be subrogated to Wray's statutory right of redemption. The
court reversed a decree for the plaintiff, holding that, as against the
lessor, the plaintiff could not assert a right to an assignment of the lease
because such an assignment would entitle the lessor to a forfeiture of
the estate. As the plaintiff had not tendered the full amount required
by the statute the court thought it unnecessary to decide whether a
sub-tenant, as such, could exercise the lessee's statutory right of redemption.

Hilsendegen v. Hartz Clothing Company 326 was a summary proceeding for possession of parts of a store building. The plaintiff demised
three connected stores and a basement to Hartz by a lease containing
a covenant against assigning or subletting without the written consent
of the lessor which was modified by a provision that, "Permission is
hereby given second party to sublet portions or departments of said
store for the same line of business, also the basement for any unobjectionable business, other than for saloon, restaurant, pawnshop and
jewelry business."
When the lease was made Hartz was operating a clothing business
in two of the stores and subletting the third to persons running a hat
hospital and tailor shop. Hartz later organized the defendant clothing
company and sublet the first two stores to it, excepting a space measuring fifteen by twenty feet in one corner. The court reversed a judgment
for the plaintiff, holding that there had been no breach of the covenant
and saying that provisions involving forfeiture are not favored and
should be construed most strongly against the lessor.
Hammond v. Hibler3 27 was a suit for an injunction against sale of
liquor. The plaintiffs leased land to Hinkle and Nolin for ten years,
the lease providing "that no building or part thereof be sublet for or
used as a saloon, or that the sale of intoxicating liquors of any form be
permitted on said premises." Hinkle and Nolin assigned the lease to a
corporation which sublet part of the premises to Harrington. The
plaintiffs, in consideration of his paying them $100 a month, gave
written permission for sale of liquor to Harrington "but not to his
heirs, assigns, executors or administrators." A judgment creditor of
3 2 6 165 Mich. 255, 130 N.W. 646 (1911). The lease contained an express provision
for reentry on breach of covenant.
327 168 Mich. 66, 133 N.W. 932 (1911). The lease contained an express provision
for reentry on breach of covenant.
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Harrington levied on his leasehold interest, bought at the sale, and
assigned the sublease to the defendant. A decree for the plaintiffs was
affirmed by a majority of four justices on the ground the permission
given Harrington was inalienable. Three justices dissented, relying on
the statement in the opinion in Wertheimer v. Hosmer quoted ·above328
that a condition against .alienation is entire, cannot be waived in part,
and is removed in toto by any waiver. One justice did not sit. The
majority opinion is probably sound. What was waived was not the
covenant against alienation but the use restriction and that by a license
to Harrington which would be personal and non-assignable even without express provision to that effect. Unlike Wertheimer v. Hosmer the
decree in this case did not enforce a covenant against alienation as a prohibition compelling a lessee to retain his estate against his will.

Flynn v. Bachner3 29 was a summary proceeding for possession of
land. Plaintiff leased a store to defendants, "for the term of three years
. . . with the privilege of two years more at the expiration of said :6.rst
three years, making, if said privilege of two years more is exercised, a
total of five years . . . to be occupied for a glove store. . . . Said parties
of the second part further covenant that they will not assign nor transfer
this lease, but can sublet if the business is satisfactory to the party of
the :6.rst part."
The defendants, with the plaintiff's oral permission, sublet part of
the store to Darr for the manufacture and sale of belts. Defendants
elected ~o extend the lease for the additional two years. After the first
three years had passed the plaintiff brought this proceeding on the
theory that the permission to sublet expired at the end of that period.
A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on the ground the lease
was for five years at the option of the lessee and the permission was coextensive with the lease.
Patterson v. Carrel3 30 was a summary proceeding for possession of
land. Mars leased the premises to Castner who covenanted not to sublet without the written assent of the lessor. The lease contained an express provision for reentry on breach of covenant. The defendant pur328 Notes 316 and 317 supra. The dissenting justices were concerned by the fact that
the plaintiffs were willing to give the defendant permission to sell liquor for a substantial
consideration. Curiously, in view of its theory, the dissenting opinion would have conditioned a decree for the defendant on his paying the $100 a month which Harrington agreed
to pay for his license.
329 168 Mich. 424, 134 N.W. 451 (1912). The lease contained an express provision
for reentry on breach of covenant.
880 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912). Accord: Pearson v. Sullivan, 209 Mich.
306, 176 N.W. 597 (1920). Acceptance of rent from the head lessee, with knowledge
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chased Castner's business, took possession of the premises without formal
assignment of the lease, and made repairs. Mars accepted rent from the
defendant and made no objection to the repairs. Mars conveyed the
reversion to the plaintiffs. A judgment for the defendant was affirmed
on the ground that, if there was any breach of the covenant against
subletting, it was waived by Mars and the waiv~r bound his transferees.

Great Lakes Realty and Building Company v. Turner 31 was a suit
to restrain forfeiture of a lease. The defendant demised land to Brown
for 99 years by a lease in which the lessee covenanted to erect a building and not to assign, except by way of mortgage, until the building
was completed. Express permission to release or sublet at any time was
granted in the lease. Brown sublet the entire tract to the plaintiff for
term of fifty years and, by a separate instrument executed on the same
day, contracted to assign the head lease to the plaintiff when the building was erected. The court affirmed an order overruling a demurrer to
the bill of complaint, holding that a contract to assign is not a breach
of a covenant against assignment. The case is significant in that it assumes the validity of a condition against assignment in a lease for a
term longer than twenty-one years. The building was to be erected in
ten years, however, so the restraint on alienation was not co-extensive
in duration with the lease itself.
McDonald v. Andrews332 was a suit for specific performance of
an option. The defendants leased land to the plaintiff for five years,
with an option to purchase. The lease contained a covenant against
assigning or subletting without the written assent of the lessors. The
lease was not executed with the formalities required for recording and,
to obtain a recordable instrument, the plaintiff assigned the lease to his
sister, who quit-claimed back without taking possession. A decree for
the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground an assignment without transfer
of possession is not a breach of a covenant against assignment. This
seems a sound application of the ancient common law rule that restraints
on alienation are enforced only to protect a reversioner or remainderman
against waste.
that he had sublet, was held to waive the breach in Struble v. Community Club, 218 Mich.
604, 188 N.W. 292 (1922). Cf. Weber v. Van Blerck Motor Co., 186 Mich. 449, 152
N.W. 1036 (1915).
381190 Mich. 582, 157 N.W. 57 (1916). The lease contained an express provision
for reentry on breach of covenant.
332199 Mich. 160, 165 N.W. 797 (1917). The lease contained an express provision
for reentry on breach of covenant.
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Miller v. Pond333 was a summary proceeding for possession of land.
Sarah Burr leased to "Ische Bros., Will C. Ische and Chas. E. Ische,
copartners" for .five years, with the privilege of a .five year extension.
The lease contained a covenant not to assign, transfer or sublet in whole
or in part without the written assent of the lessor and an express provision for reentry on breach of covenant. The plaintiff purchased the
reversion. The Isches sold Pond a two-thirds interest in their business
and admitted him into their partnership. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on the ground that adding a partner to a lessee .firm
is not a breach of a covenant against assignment. The court said that
the words, "in whole or part'' applied only to subletting.
C. J. Netting Company v. Sillman334 was a suit to restrain summary proceedings for possession of land. The Sillmans leased land to
the Chinese-American Realty Company for :fifty years by an instrument
which provided,
"Said lessee shall not sell or assign this lease without the consent of the lessors in writing.•.. If this lease shall by operation of
law devolve upon or pass to any person or persons other than said
lessee (the foregoing being hereinafter referred to as events of
defeasance), then the lessors may elect to declare the terms of this
lease ended and exercise the right of reentry and re-possession
herein elsewhere conferred in case of default."

The lessee erected a valuable building and mortgaged it for $75,000
to the Peninsular State Bank. The plaintiff levied on the leasehold
under a judgment against the lessee and bought at execution sale. The
lessors commenced summary proceedings to enforce a forfeiture and
the plaintiff started this suit, asserting equity jurisdiction on the ground,
inter alia, that the condition was ambiguous. The court reversed an
order denying a motion to dismiss, saying that the condition was not
ambiguous and that the only question was as to its validity, which
could be determined at law. The opinion gives no intimation of the
court's view as to the validity of a condition against involuntary alienation except to suggest, indirectly, that it depends upon whether the
statute permitting sale of estates for years on execution335 confers upon
333 214 Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921). Cf. Tierney v. McKay, 232 Mich. 609,
206 N.W. 325 (1925), where the withdrawal of one of two partners from the lessee firm
was held not to be a breach of a similar covenant.
334 226 Mich. 307, 197 N.W. 545 (1924).
335 "Leasehold interests in lands shall be subject to levy and sale upon execution.
Proceedings to and including the sale shall be the same in all respects as in the case of
real estate sold on execution.". Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 23, §141; Comp. Laws (1915)
§12956; Comp. Laws (1929) §14676; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1640; Comp. Laws (1948)
§623.141.
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such estates an inseparable incident which cannot be restrained by condition.

McPheeters v. Birkholz:'3 36 was an action of trespass on the case
for wrongful eviction. The defendants leased a farm to the plaintiff on
shares for a year from June 1917. The defendant left on September 15,
to be with his wife in another state during her confinement, leaving a
hired man in charge of the farm. A few days later the defendants
seized possession of the farm by force. The court affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff for triple damages under the statute of forcible entry
and detainer, 337 saying that, although a lease on shares implies a covenant that the lessee will give the farm his personal attention, there was
no breach in this instance and, even if there had been a breach, it would
not have entitled the lessors to declare a forfeiture in the absence of an
express provision therefor in the lease. The opinion states that, in general, breach of a covenant in a lease does not work a forfeiture in the
absence of a provision for reentry but suggests that there may be an
exception to that rule in the case of covenants against alienation.338

Webb v. Knauss339 was a summary proce~ding for possession of
land. The plaintiff demised land to Unger for 99 years by a· lease containing a covenant against assignment without the written consent of
the lessor and a provision permitting the lessee to sublet in whole or in
part without such consent. Unger assigned to Knauss with the written permission of the lessor. Knauss died and his widow succeeded to
his interest. Mrs. Knauss, by an instrument purporting to be a sublease, transferred the whole of the unexpired term to the Houghtens.
·The Houghtens assigned to Flint. After learning of these assignments
the plaintiff commenced a summary proceeding for possession for nonpayment of rent against Mrs. Knauss, the Houghtens and Flint and
took a judgment against all of them, which was paid by Mrs. Knauss.
The plaintiff then commenced a summary proceeding for possession
against the same defendants on the ground the purported sublease from
Mrs. Knauss to the Houghtens was an assignment and worked a forfeiture. The defendants contended that the permission to assign to
336 232
337 Act

Mich. 370, 205 N.W. 196 (1925).
314, P.A. 1915, c. 33, §19; Comp. Laws (1915) §13376; Comp. Laws (1929)
§15113; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2130; Comp. Laws (1948) §633.19; reenacting Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 111, §3; Comp. Laws (1857) §4717; Comp. Laws (1871) §6372; How. Stat.,
§7957; Comp. Laws (1897) §11206.
338 232 Mich. 377, 205 N.W. 199, citing Wray-Austin Machinery Co. v. Flower, 140
Mich. 452, 103 N.W. 873 (1905).
339 253 Mich. 197, 234 N.W. 154 (1931). The lease contained an express provision
for reentry on breach of condition. The estate for years passed to Mrs. Knauss by will.

1952]

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

823

Knauss destroyed the whole covenant against assignment3 40 and that,
even if it did not, the lessor's taking a judgment for rent against the
assignees waived the breach. The court held that the purported sublease was an assignment but affirmed a judgment for the defendants on
the second ground urged by them, without discussing the fast. The
case is significant in that it assumes the validity of a restraint on alienation in a 99-year lease which is operative for the full term of the lease.
The Michigan decisions clearly affirm the validity of a provision in
a commercial lease for forfeiture to the lessor on alienation by the lessee.
There is nothing in them to indicate that the rule is otherwise in the
case of a provision intended to be operative for the full period of a
lease for a very long term, such as a thousand years or 99 years renewable forever. There are no Michigan decisions on restraints on alienation of non-commercial leasehold interests and there is nothing to suggest that the rule governing them is any different from that which applies to like restraints in commercial leases. 341 No Michigan case deals
with a provision for forfeiture to someone other than the lessor but such
a provision is probably valid. 342
Three Michigan decisions suggest that a covenant against alienation
in a lease for years is, or may be made through specific performance by
injunction to operate as, a prohibition on alienation which disables the
lessee from transferring his estate and forces him to retain it, with all
its burdens and public obligations, against his will.343 If this is so, the
law of Michigan on this point is out of harmony with that of England
and the great majority of jurisdictions in this country. 344 It does not appear that the Michigan Supreme Court was fully aware when it rendered these decisions of their inconsistency with the principles of the
common law as those principles have stood since the abolition of perpetually unbarrable entails in 1472. It is to be hoped that the court will
overrule those three decisions and replace them with the sound rule of
Mandlebaum v. McDonell345 that all prohibitory restraints on alienation
of legal estates in land are void.
340 As to this contention see the language in Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47
N.W. 47 (1890), quoted at note 317 supra.
341 Cf. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT 410 (1944), note 305 supra.
342 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §27, note 307 supra.
3 43 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Darmstaetter v. Hoffman, 120 Mich. 48, 78 N.W. 1014 (1899); Smith v. Applebaum, 241 Mich. 493, 217
N.W. 401 (1928).
344 Notes 297 and 298 supra.
345 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra. Accord with the rule proposed by the text:
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944).
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Public policy is no explanation of why every restraint on alienation
of an estate in fee simple, even if limited in duration to a single day, is
absolutely void, whereas restraints on alienation of estates for years are
fully valid, although general in scope and extending for the full duration of the term, and although the term may be for a thousand years
or more. The reversioner under a short term lease has a real interest
in the integrity and good husbandry of his tenant; the reversioner under a thousand year lease, particularly if no rent is reserved, has no substantial interest in his tenant's character or behavior; a restraint on
alienation for his benefit means merely that he may impose a pecuniary
mulct on the tenant as a condition of assenting to a transfer. This was
was the practice of feudal overlords of tenants in fee simple until it
was stopped by the enactment of the statute Quia Emptores T errarum.346 Restraints on estates for long terms of years are as objectionable as those upon estates in fee simple. If the restraint extends to involuntary alienation, the impediment to creditors is manifest. Moreover, such restraints impede the economic utilization of land to its full
capacity. An industrial concern may be financially unable to move its
operations to a new and more suitable location if it cannot transfer its
existing plant to another concern without paying a lessor a prohibitive
fee. When land under a long term lease should have a new building
and th~ lessee cannot finance construction without assigning or encumbering his estate, if the lessor insists upon the full anticipated gain
from the venture as a condition of his assent, no building is likely to
be built. Such restraints may also impede maximum utilization of
human capacities by restricting mobility. For example, a professional
man whose chief asset is a rent-free long-term lease of a house, subject
to forfeiture on alienation, is financially bound to exercise his talents in
the vicinity of the house although they might develop more fully and
be of greater social utility in some other locality. 347 It is probable that
general restraints on alienation of long-term leases will be used to evade
the recent United States Supreme Court decisions prohibiting the enforcement of use restrictions against occupancy by members of a particular race. 348
·
It may be that we need a new statute Quia Emptores T errarum to
prohibit restraints on alienation of estates for years which are imposed
of Westminster ill, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). See notes 7, 104, 328 supra.
especially true of clergymen and university professors whose social value is
high but whose incomes are so low that the availability of a free house is likely to be
decisive as to their location. See note 318 supra.
348 McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), reversing Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614,
25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947).
346 Statute
347 This is
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for undesirably long periods. 349 Extension of the existing constitutional
prohibition on long-term leases of agricultural land350 to all types of
leases would accomplish the purpose but might interfere unduly with
Hexibility in conveyancing. Perhaps a statute providing that no restraint on alienation in a lease should be valid for more than twenty-one
years after its execution would be desirable.

VI.

RESTRAINTS ON INTERESTS IN EXPECTANCY IN LAND

The common law recognized a number of interests in land which
were not presently possessory but would or might become so. These
included the interest of an owner of a freehold estate who had leased
the land for a term of years, the interest of the owner of an estate for
years who had sublet for a lesser term and the interest of an owner of a
freehold estate who had conveyed a lesser freehold estate. These interests were all known as reversions but their incidents differed because
the reversioner of the first type had seisin whereas those of the other
two types did not. From the end of the thirteenth century the common
law recognized the remainder, an estate limited in a conveyance to
commence in possession upon the terminatjon of a prior estate in tail,
for life or for years created by the same conveyance.351 The validity of
contingent remainders was not recognized until the fifteenth century
and then only when preceded by an estate of freehold. 352 From a very
early period the law recognized the interesse termini, the interest of the
owner of an estate for years which is to commence in the future. 353 The
reversion, the remainder and the interesse termini were the only estates
in expectancy known to the common law but it also recognized certain
other interests in expectancy which did not rise to the dignity of estates.
34 9 Professor Gray suggested the need for legislation on the subject. REsTRAINTs oN
ALmNATION, 2d ed., 90 (1895).
350 Note 306. It should be noted that the prohibition has no application to a lease
which does not reserve rent or services. Hence the constitutional provision fails to regulate
noncommercial leases, the type which, as the Restatement of Property recognizes, are most
likely to be used to set up objectionable perpetuities.
351 Fitz William v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33 Edw. I, 20 (1305).
352 Sir Thomas Littleton seems to have considered contingent remainders invalid.
TENURBs, §721 (1481). Butler v. Bray, 2 Dyer 189b at 190b, 73 Eng. Rep. 418 at 420
(1560); Chudleigh's Case, l Co. Rep. 120a at 130a, 134b, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 at 296, 304
(1589-95); Goodright v. Cornish, l Salk. 226, 91 Eng. Rep. 200 (1694); 3 HoLDsWORTH,
H1sTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 134-137 (1923); 7 id. 85 (1926).
353 l CoKE, INSTITUTES 45b, 46b. Strictly speaking, the interesse termini was not an
estate but it was much more than a mere possibility or right of entry or action. Saffyn's
Case, 5 Co. Rep. 123b at 124b, 77 Eng. Rep. 248 at 250 (1605); 7 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 247 (1923); Bordwell, "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal,"
I Mo. L. REv. 119 at 133-137 (1936).
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These included the right of entry or of action of the disseised or dispossessed owner of a possessory estate, the right of action of a reversioner
or remainderman whose estate had been discontinued by the tortious
operation of a conveyance made by the owner of the possessory estate,
the right of entry retained by one who conveyed an estate subject to a
condition subsequent, inchoate dower and unassigned dower consummate. Whether the common law recognized the -possibility of reverter,
which is the interest. if any there can be, retained by one who has conveyed a determinable estate which is not on condition subsequent, is
not clear.354 The Statutes of Uses and Wills added four types of
estates in expectancy, the springing use, the shifting use, the springing
executory devise and the shifting executory devise. 355
Reversions of all three types356 and interessia termini357 were, from
an early period, as freely alienable inter vivos as like possessory estates.
There is doubt as to the alienability of remainders at the early common
law but it was settled by the sixteenth century that vested remainders
were transferable inter vivos. 358 Contingent remainders and all of the
other mentioned types of interests in expectancy were inalienable at
common law3 59 except that a right of entry on breach of condition subse354 E.g., the interest retained bv A after conveying "to B and his heirs so long as the
Penobscot Building shall stand." CHALLis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 263-268,
437-439 (1911); GRAY, RuLE AGAINST P.ERPETUITllls, 3d ed., 24-44, 579-587 (1915).
Professor Gray thought that the possibility of reverter was a form of reversion and that the
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum prohibited the retention of any type of reversion on a
conveyance in fee simple. Unfortunately, the courts in this country have not always been
careful to distinguish, on the one hand, between the possibility of reverter and the right
of entry for breach of condition subsequent, both of which are reversionary possibilities
created according to the rules of the common law unmodified by statute, and, on the other
hand, between these reversionary possibilities and the shifting use limited in favor of the
granter, operating under the Statute of Uses, which is not a reversionary possibility but a
future estate. As to such shifting uses, see DIGBY, HisTORY OF nm LAW oF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed., 354-356 (1892).
355 BRooKJJ, GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, "Feffements al Uses," pl. 30, 50 (1573);
DIGBY, HISTORY oF nm LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed., 357-359 (1892); 4 HoLDswoRTH, HrsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 440, 474 (1924); PROPERTY REsTAT.BMl!NT Introductory Note to Div. III (1936).
356 Freehold reversion expectant upon a term for years: Pesehale v. Fitz Aucher, Bract.
N.B., pl. 533 (1231); Reversion in a term for years: Rawlyns's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 52a, 76
Eng. Rep. 1007 (1587); Reversion in fee expectant upon a lesser freehold: Cambridge v.
Risle, R.S.Y.B. 34 Edw. I, 314 (1306); Edward Fox's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep.
616 (1609). So far as present rights against the tenant in possession (rent due under a
lease or sublease, etc.) attomment, voluntary or compulsory, was necessary to complete the
transfer until Stat. 4 _Ann., c. 16, §9 (1705), but the reversion, so far as it was an interest
in expectancy, passed by the grant or assignment, without attomment. Rawlyns's Case, supra.
357Bruerton v. Rainsford, Cro. Eliz. 15, 78 Eng. Rep. 281 (1583); Wheeler v. Thorogood, Cro. Eliz. 127, 78 Eng: Rep. 384 (1589); Saffyn's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 123b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 248, sub nom. Saffyn v. Adams, Cro. Jae. 60, 79 Eng. Rep. 50 (1605).
358 N. v. Crowe, R.S.Y.B. 21 Edw. I, 185, 189 (1293); SHEPPARD, ToucHSTON.B OF
CoMMoN AssURANcEs 238 (1648).
359 Contingent estates (remainders, uses and executory interests), see: Lampet's Case,
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quent which was appurtenant to a reversion could be transferred with
the reversion360 and an otherwise inalienable interest in expectancy
could be released to the owner of a present estate.361 Reversions in
estates for years, the second type of reversion mentioned above, and
interessia termini passed as chattel interests on the death of the owner
and could always be bequeathed by will.362 Reversions, remainders and
other interests in expectancy in fee were heritable and those which
were estates were devisable. 363 This was the state of the English law
when it was brought to Michigan by the Upper Canada statute of
1792.364
The English authority on the validity of restraints on alienation of
interests in expectancy is scanty. In 1382 it was decided that a condition in a life lease, that if the lessor conveyed the reversion it should be
10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612); King v. Withers, Cases T. Talbot 117 at 123,
25 Eng. Rep. 693 at 695 (1735); Doe ex dem. Brune v. Martyn, 8 B. & C. 497 at 516,
108 Eng. Rep. 1127 at 1134 (1828). A transfer for consideration of a shifting use was
given effect in equity after the contingency occurred in Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 409,
27 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1749-50) and it was decided in the nineteenth century that a contingent future estate could be transferred, by way of estoppel, by levying a fine, Doe ex
dem. Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (1829), but the confusion
in the authorities reflected in Doe ex dem. Brune v. Martyn, supra, indicates that the possibility of making an effective voluntary transfer of a contingent future estate in any way
was, to say the least, highly doubtful throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
A contingent estate could be transferred by the commissioners in bankruptcy of the owner.
Higden v. Williamson, 3 P. Wms. 132, 24 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1732); 1 Co. Rep. 66b,
Fraser's Note Z. Right of entry: Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540); Partridge v. Strange,
l Plowden 77 at 88, 75 Eng. Rep. 123 at 140 (1552) (holding that such interests were
inalienable at common law and that the statute subjected them to forfeiture for attempted
alienation); Sir Moyle Finch's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 63a at 70a, 77 Eng. Rep. 348 at 362
(1606); Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester, 8 East 552, 103 Eng. Rep. 454 (1809);
Lnn.EToN, TENUREs §347 (1481); 1 CoKE, lNsnTUTEs 265a (Butler's Note No. 212 to
13th ed., 1787); Dower: See 1 CoKE, lNsnnrrEs 32b.
Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, §1 (1540).
Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612). A married woman
could not make an ordinary conveyance to her husband or anyone else but dower could be
released by the husband and wife levying a fine or suffering a common recovery in favor
of a purchaser of the husband's estate. Id. at 49b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1000; l CRUISE, DIGEST
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 187; 5 id., 178-179, 417. Curtesy
initiate was not an interest in expectancy but a present possessory estate for life.
36 2 l CoKE, lNsTITuTBs 46b.
3 63 King v. Withers, Cases T. Talbot 117 at 123, 25 Eng. Rep. 693 at 695 (1735)
(intestate succession); Selwyn v. Selwyn, 2 Burr. 1131, 97 Eng. Rep. 750 (1761) (contingent executory interest devisable); Roe ex dem. Perry v. Jones, l H. Bl. 30, 126 Eng.
Rep. 20 (1788) (contingent remainder devisable); Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester,
8 East 552, 103 Eng. Rep. 454 (1809) (right of entry not devisable). The descent of a
future interest was peculiar in that, when it became possessory, the heir of the person who
had last acquired it by purchase (i.e., other than by descent) took. This was not necessarily
the heir of the last person who had owned the interest. 3 Sll\1BS, FuTURB INTERESTS 169
(1936).
364 32 Geo. III (Upper Canada), c. 1, §3 (1792), note 33 supra.
360
3 61
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forfeited to the life tenant, was void. 365 In 1587 a provision in a will
that if devisees of a contingent remainder in fee simple "go about to
sell" before the remainder vested they should forfeit their estate was
treated as valid.366 As contingent remainders were inalienable at that
time the decision is not conclusive as to the validity of a penalty restraint •
on alienation of a contingent future interest. The modem English cases
indicate that such a restraint is valid but they are not in harmony as to
the validity of restraints on vested interests in expectancy.367 The
weight of American authority tends toward the view that penalty restraints on alienation of contingent future interests intended to operate
only while they remain contingent, are valid, but that restraints on alienation of indefeasibly vested estates in expectancy are valid only to the
extent that they would be valid as applied to like possessory estates.368
The Restatement of Property takes the position that all prohibitory
restraints on alienation of future estates which would otherwise be
alienable, that is, restraints which would compel the owner to remain
such against his will, are void. 369 As to penalty restraints, the Restatement considers a restraint which may last until after the interest becomes possessory or becomes indefeasibly vested is valid only if a like
restraint on a possessory estate of the same duration would be. It takes
no position on the validity of penalty restraints which are certain not
to operate after the estate becomes possessory or indefeasibly vested. 370
365 Plesyngton's Case, Bellewe 101, 72 Eng. Rep. 43 (1382); STATHAM, ABRIDGMENT,
Condicions, pl. 14. But see PERKINS, PROFITABLE BooKE §§729, 730 (1642). It may be
that this case was decided on the basis of the common law rule that a condition could not
enure to the benefit of anyone other than the lessor. The case was cited in support of this
rule in Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 12 (1505). See BnooKE, GRAUNDE
ABRIDGMENT, Conditions, pl. 83 (1573). If this is the basis of the decision in Plesyngton's
Case, it is not of much help in determining the law of restraints on alienation.
366 Large's Case, 2 Leon. 82, 3 Leon. 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 376, 620 (1587). It was
held that the giving of a 240 year lease by one of the remaindennen was not a breach of
the restraint.
367 GRAY, REsTRAINTs ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 33-38 (1895); Sweet, "Restraints on
Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236 at 246 (1917); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation
of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1214-1215 (1935); 2 S1MEs, FuTURE INTERESTS 311-312 (1936).
368 The cases have been collected by Professors Schnebly and Simes, note 367 supra.
Professor Schnebly says (p. 1213), "No authority has been found which has divided the
restraint, and upheld it for the period of time during which the future interest may remain
non-possessory."
369 Section 405 and §411, comment a (1944).
370 Section 411 : "A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the alienation of a
legal future estate, which restraint may last until after the interest becomes possessory or
becomes indefeasibly vested, is valid if, and only if, a similar restraint on a legal possessory
estate of the same duration would be valid. Caveat: The Institute takes no position as to
the validity of promissory restraints or forfeiture restraints which are certain not to last until
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The Michigan statutes codify the law of estates in expectancy and
provide that they are descendible, devisable and alienable, in the same
manner as estates in possession.371 Consequently the question of rhe
alienability of contingent future estates has not been in doubt here. 3 ' 2
The questions which have caused difficulty have been those which involve interests in expectancy which are not estates. Until the rule was
after the future estate becomes possessocy or indefeasibly vested." The Restatement, unlike
the Michigan statutes, treats reversions, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach
of condition subsequent as future interests. Sec. 153, comment a; §154, comment e; §155;
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §9; note 371 infra. The Restatement does not treat possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry as future estates, however, and it does not deal with inchoate
dower and curtesy initiate. Sections 154(3), 155, 153(1) (2).
371 Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 266, §24, provided: ''When any contingent remainder, execu•
tocy devise, or other estate in expectancy, is so granted or limited to any person, that in
case of his death before the happening of the contingency, the estate would descend to his
heirs in fee simple, such person may, before the happening of the contingency, sell, assign,
or devise the premises, subject to the contingency." This was superseded by the following
provisions of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 52, which are still in force:
"Sec. 7. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are divided into estates in
possession, and the estates in expectancy.
"Sec. 8. An estate in possession is where the owner has an immediate right to the
possession of the land; an estate in expectancy is where the right to the possession is postponed to a future period.
"Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy are divided into, First. Estates commencing at a
future day, denominated future estates; and, Second. Reversions.
"Sec. 10. A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession at a future
day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate, or on the determination, by lapse
of time or otherwise, of a precedent estate, created at the same time.
"Sec. 11. When a future estate is dependent upon a precedent estate, it may be
termed a remainder, and may be created and transferred by that name.
"Sec. 12. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor or his heirs, or in
the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession on the determination of a particular estate
granted or devised.
"Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or contingent: They are vested when there
is a person in being who would have an immediate right to the possession of the lands,
upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate. They are contingent whilst the
person to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to take effect remains uncertain.
"Sec. 35. Expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alienable in the same
manner as estates in possession.
"Sec. 42. All expectant estates, except such as are enumerated and defined in this
chapter, are abolished."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2591 to 2597, 2619, 2626; Comp. Laws
(1871) §§4074 to 4080, 4102, 4109; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8789 to 8795, 8817, 8825;
How. Stat., §§5523 to 5529, 5551, 5558; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11525 to 11531, 11553,
11560; Comp. Laws (1929) §§11297 to 12933, 12955, 12962; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.7 to
26.13, 35, 42; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.7 to 554.13, 554.35, 554.42. See also §§14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, notes 257, 279, 307 supra.
Despite sections 9 and 10 it has been held that a reversion expectant upon an estate
for years is a present estate in possession. Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W.
814 (1879). See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §154, comment f; Cf. CHALLIS, LAw OP REAL
PROPERTY, 3d ed., 99-100 (1911).
372 Inter vivos transfer: Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927).
Transfer by bankruptcy: Horton v. Moore, (6th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 189, cert. den.,
Moore v. Horton, 311 U.S. 692 (1940), rehearing den. 311 U.S. 728 (1940). Transfer
by will: see L'Etoumeau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1077 (1891). Intestate
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changed by statute in 1847, Michigan held that a disseisee, that is, the
owner of land in the adverse possession of another, could not convey it
to anyone except the person in possession.373 Similarly, until the rule
was abrogated by statute in 1931, it was held that a right of entry on
breach of condition subsequent n'ot appurtenant to a reversion was
inalienable and that an attempt to transfer such a right forfeited it. 374
descent: Curtis v. Fowler, 66 Mich. 696, 33 N.W. 804 (1887). The problem was complicated, however, by decisions finding an implied condition of survivorship until the estate
vested. Thus, in Hadley v. Henderson, 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75 (1921) a shifting
executory interest to a daughter in case a devisee in fee died without issue was held to ''lapse"
upon the death of the daughter before the first devisee, and in In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich.
208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), cert. den. sub nom. Delbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931)
a contingent remainder to nieces and nephews if a life tenant should die without issue was
held to ''lapse" as to nieces and nephews who predeceased the life tenant. See 2 SrMES,
Fu'l'URE lNrERESTS 90-95 (1936). In an attempt to overrule these decisions the legislature,
by Act 211, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.47; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.101, provided:
"In all cases where the owner of an expectant estate, right or interest in real or personal
property, shall die prior to the termination of the precedent or intermediate estate, if the
contingency arises by which such owner would have been entitled to an estate in possession
if living, his heirs. at law if he died intestate, or his devisees or grantees and assigns if he
shall have devised or conveyed such right or interest, shall be entitled to the same estate in
possession.'' The statute has been treated as effective for the intended purpose but not retroactive. Stevens v. Wildy, 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937); Dodge v. Detroit Trust
Company, 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942).
373 Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. 19 (Mich. 1843) [holding that Stat. 32
Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540) note 359 supra, to the same effect, was not in force here but
that a conveyance by a disseisee was void at common law as an act of maintenance]; Stockton v. Williams, 1 Doug. 546 (Mich. 1845) (giving limited effect to the conveyance);
Hubbard v. Smith, 2 Mich. 207 (1851); Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24 (1870). Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 65, §7, provided, "No grant or conveyance of lands or interest therein, shall
be void for the reason that, at the time of the execution thereof such lands shall be in the
actual possession of another claiming adversely.'' Comp. Laws (1857) §2726; Comp. Laws
(1871) §4209; How. Stat., §5657; Comp. Laws (1897) §8961; Comp. Laws (1915)
§11693; Comp. Laws (1929) §13283; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.526; Comp. Laws (1948)
§565.7. Probably the statute transforms the right of entry of a disseisee into a present possessory estate.
'
374 Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 308, 194 N.W.
1005 (1923); County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. ll2, 226 N.W. 867 (1929); Quinn v.
Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Avery v. Consumers
Power Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State Highway Commissioner,
283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State Highway Commissioner, 287 Mich.
35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938). Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.851; Comp. Laws
(1948) §554.111, provides: "The reversionary interest in lands conveyed on a condition
subsequent may be granted, conveyed, transferred or devised by the owner of such interest,
and by the subsequent grantees or devisees thereof, either before or after the right of reentry becomes effective: Provided, That this act shall not affect any such interest created
before it takes effect.'' A right of entry on breach of condition subsequent reserved in a
conveyance in fee must be distinguished from the title remaining in an owner in fee who
has granted an easement determinable upon cessation of the prescribed use. The fee subject to the easement may be transferred. Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal Ry. Co., 174
Mich. 138, 140 N.W. _535 (1913). See Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., supra.
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A

right of entry on breach of condition subsequent appurtenant to a
reversion expectant upon an estate for years is alienable with the reversion375 and the same seems to be true as to a right of entry on breach
of condition subsequent appurtenant to a reversion expectant upon a
freehold estate, even though created after the repeal of the English
statutes and before the enactment of the Michigan statute of 1931.376
Michigan probably recognizes the existence of possibilities of reverter
and holds them inalienable, the 1931 statute being limited to rights of
entry on breach of condition subsequent. 377 Inchoate dower may be
released to the husband378 or to a purchaser of the fee379 but unassigned
dower is otherwise inalienable, even after it has become consummate
by the death of the husband. 380
375 Patterson v. Carrel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912); Miller v. Pond, 214
Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921).
376 Hamilton v. Wickson, 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902); Hess v. Haas, 230
Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925); 3 SrMllS, FarnRB OOl!RllSTS 162 (1936).
377 Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870); School District No. 5 of Delhi v. Everett,
52 Mich. 314, 17 N.W. 926 (1883); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248
Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929). See Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143,
239 N.W. 376 (1931). The Michigan Supreme Court has not always been careful in its
terminology and has sometimes tended to confuse the common law possibility of reverter
with the right of entry on breach of condition subsequent. Although both of these interests
are inalienable if created before the 1931 statute and the possibility of reverter is probably
still inalienable, it would seem that a shifting use limited to the grantor should be alienable
like any other future estate. See note 354 supra; 3 SrMBs, FUTURll lNrBRBsTs 159-160
(1936). As to the validity of a limitation of a shifting use to the grantor, see 1 S1MBs,
273-274.

378 Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563 (1877); Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 306, 16
N.W. 659 (1883); Owen v. Yale, 75 Mich. 256, 42 N.W. 817 (1889); Wright v. Wright,
79 Mich. 527, 44 N.W. 944 (1890); Dakin v. Dakin, 97 Mich. 284, 56 N.W. 562
(1893); Chittock v. Chittock, 101 Mich. 367, 59 N.W. 655 (1894); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 112 Mich. 274, 70 N.W. 582 (1897); La Plant v. Lester, 150 Mich. 336, 113
N.W. 1115 (1907). In re Berner's Estate, 217 Mich. 612, 187 N.W. 377 (1912); Hagerty v. Union Guardian Trust Company, 258 Mich. 133, 244 N.W. 211 (1932). As
between the husband and wife, the consideration for such a release must be adequate:
Wright v. Wright, supra; Bechtel v. Barton, 147 Mich. 318, 110 N.W. 935 (1907).
379Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 66, §13; Comp. Laws (1857) §2784; Comp. Laws (1871)
§4281; Comp. Laws (1897) §8930; How Stat., §5745; Comp. Laws (1915) §11662; Comp.
Laws (1929) §13080; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.229; Comp. Laws (1948) §558.13. Inchoate
dower is bound by the wife's joinder in the husband's mortgage, Oades v. Standard Savings
& Loan Assn., 257 Mich. 469, 241 N.W. 262 (1932), or executory land contract, Hendricks v. Wolf, 279 Mich. 598, 273 N.W. 282 (1937). Cf. Richmond v. Robinson, 12
Mich. 193 (1864). A wife may give her husband a power of attorney to bar dower by
joining her in his conveyances. Continental National Bank v. Gustin, 297 Mich. 134, 297
N.W. 214 (1941).
380 Inchoate dower: Lott v. Lott, 146 Mich. 580, 109 N.W. 1126 (1906); Cf. Raynor
v. Lee, 20 Mich. 384 (1870); Unassigned dower consummate: Galbraith v. Fleming, 60
Mich. 408, 27 N.W. 583 (1886). However, in Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167
N.W. 1021 (1918), where the widow quit-claimed unassigned dower to the plaintiff and
later released it to the heirs, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled in equity as against
both the widow and the heirs to compel the widow to secure admeasurement of her dower
and convey it to him.
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T orrey3 81 was a suit to restrain eviction proceedings.

A testator devised land to his widow for life, remainder to his children
in fee simple with a proviso that it should "remain undivided in the
use, occupation and possession of all my children now living, until the
youngest child attains the age of 21 years." The widow and those
children who were of age executed conveyances purporting to transfer
their interests to the defendant and later, before the youngest child was
21, brought this suit. The interests of the minor children had been conveyed to the defendant under probate court license. An injunction was
dissolved, the Chancellor holding that the restraint was upon partition,
not upon alienation, and that its validity need not be decided. He
stated that provisions in restraint of alienation are not to be favored.
Mandlehaum

11.

McDonell382 was a suit to quiet title. A will, as

construed by the court, devised land to the testator's widow for life with
remainder in fee simple to his three sons, a grandson, Ellen Daily and
Ann Baxter, the interests of the latter two being subject to a condition
subsequent requiring them to live with the widow until they married.
The will provided: "the same to remain unsold until [the grandson]
shall be twenty-five years of age, or until twenty-one years from the date
hereof, in case of his death, and not then to be sold in case my wife is
still living, and that she remains my widow, and until after her death."
The will also stated that the devises were upon condition that, until
the period mentioned had elapsed, "it shall not be competent for any
of my devisees hereinbefore named to either dispose of, alienate, mortgage, barter, pledge or transfer any portion of the real estate ... either
directly or indirectly, upon any pretext whatever.... All documents
or instruments whatever, executed by any of my devisees, which shall
be in contravention of the true intent and meaning of this, my last
will and testament, shall be deemed and be taken to be null and void
and of no effect whatever."
The three sons and the grandson were the sole heirs at law. Ann
Baxter did not live with the widow until her marriage; Ellen Daily did.
The widow did not remarry. After the marriage of Ellen Daily, she,
the widow, the three sons and the grandson, who was not yet 25, executed conveyances under which the pla1ntiff claimed. The court affirmed a decree for the plaintiff, holding that the conveyances were
381 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836). The restraint also involved possessory estates.
This aspect of the case has been discussed above at note 135 [50 MICH. L. RBv. 675 at 706
(1952)].
382 29 Mich. 78 (1874). Also discussed above at note 138 [50 MrcH. L. RBv. 675
at 707 (1952)].
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effective to give the plaintiff an absolute title in fee simple. The court
thought the language of the will was intended to impose a prohibition
on alienation and held that such a restraint upon a vested remainder in
fee simple is void, saying also that a forfeiture restraint upon alienation
of a vested remainder in fee simple is likewise void. The opinion
states,
"Nor does the fact that, in the case of an executory devise, or
in that of a contingent remainder, or any other interest not vested,
a restriction upon the power of the devisees to sell before it shall
become vested in interest, would be good, in any manner tend to
sustain such a restriction upon a vested estate in fee." 383

Harlow 11. Lake Superior Iron Company3 84 was an action of ejectment brought by an assignee of an undivided half of a 99-year lease.
The lease, given by the owner in fee simple of the land, demised an undivided half of the land for mining purposes, and provided, "I hereby
agree and bind myself not to sell, assign, or encumber said undivided
interest hereby leased, unless said [lessee], his heirs or assigns, shall
have the first refusal to purchase said undivided one-half...."
A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on the ground the
lease demised only an incorporeal interest which could not be subdivided or recovered in ejectment. The opinion contains language
suggesting the validity of the pre-emptive option granted by the quoted
provision of the lease.385
Lariverre 11. Rains3 86 was a suit to set aside conveyances as a cloud
on title. Mrs. White executed an instrument conveying to her husband
an estate for his life to commence at her death, then to her son Joseph
an estate for his life, providing each "sees :6.t to use and occupy the same
so long as a home and residence," and the fee simple expectant upon the
prior life estates to the children of Joseph, "It being expressly understood and agreed that the right to use and occupy, as above stated, is
intended to be a life interest, and not transferable," so far as the husband
and Joseph were concerned. Later Mr. and Mrs. White conveyed the
land in fee to Doyle, who conveyed to the defendants. Mrs. White died
and the children of Joseph brought this suit in the lifetime of Mr.
883 29
884 36
885 Id.

Mich. 78 at 88-89 (1874).
Mich. 105 (1877). Also mentioned above at note 312.
at 120-121. Cf. Windiate v. Lorman, note 231 supra [50 MrcH. L. R.Ev.
675 at 734-735 (1952)].
886 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897). Also discussed at note 264 supra. The
estate of Mr. White was a contingent springing use, that of Joseph a vested shifting use
subject to a condition subsequent. See CHALLIS, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 124-125
(1911); note 391 infra.
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White and Joseph. The court reversed a decree for the defendants,
holding that the life estates of Mr. White and Joseph were forfeited by
alienation and ceasing to occupy the land. The opinion takes no account of the facts that Joseph had not attempted to convey his
future life estate and that he could have no right to occupy before that
estate became possessory. As both life estates were future interests, the
decision seems to stand for the proposition that a penalty restraint upon
alienation of a vested future estate for life is valid even though so
phrased as to continue after the estate becomes possessory.

Portage Grange No. 16 v. Portage Lodge No. 34D3 87 was a suit to
restrain interference with the plaintiff's lessee. The plaintiff leased a
lodge room to the defendant, for use in common by both parties, the
lease providing that the premises "cannot be leased or rented to any
lodge" without the consent of both. The plaintiff, without the consent
of the defendant, leased the room to the Ladies of the Modem Maccabees, for use in common with the defendant. The defendant refused to
allow the ladies to use the room. The court affirmed a decree for the
defendant, assuming without discussion the validity of the restraint on
alienation. If the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple,388 the decision
operates to enforce as a prohibition a restraint on alienation of a reversion in fee. This is clearly in conflict with Mandlebaum v. McDonell.389 Even if the interest of the plaintiff was less than a fee the deci-'
sion is in conflict with the well-settled rules that no prohibitory restraint
on alienation of a legal interest is valid and that restraints on alienation
may be imposed only for the benefit of a reversion or remainder in the
land.
Des Grand Champ v. Duµo 390 was a suit to construe a will which
devised a life estate to the testator's brother, remainder to some of the
testator's heirs. A clause of the will relating to the remainder provided,
387 141 Mich. 402, 104 N.W. 667 (1905). Also discussed above at note 168 [50
MicH. L. Rnv. 675 at 717 (1952)].
388 The pleadings indicate that, some twenty-five years before this litigation, the two
organizations which were the principal parties to it, agreed informally to purchase land
and erect a hall on it cooperatively with a view to use in common. Title was taken in the
name of the plaintiff grange alone because the defendant lodge was unincorporated. The
defendant lodge contended that the 99 year lease involved in the litigation did not correctly
represent the original understanding. Record, pp. 1, 11, 12, 19, 20. The opinions of both
the circuit and supreme courts treat the plaintiff grange, however, as owning a fee simple
in severalty, subject only to the 99 year lease. If, as perhaps should have been done, the
plaintiff ,grange had been treated as holding the legal fee on trust for itself and the defendant lodge the problem involved would have been one of the law of trusts.
389 Note 382 supra.
390 169. Mich. 104, 135 N.W. 98 (1912).
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"It is my wish that the property . : . remain unsold. . . . I make this request because it was the wish of my father that the Fisheries remain
unsold and be known as the DuHo property." The court held that this
provision was not intended to be mandatory but that if it were it would
be void.
Conant v. Stone391 was a suit to construe a will providing, "My said
son to have the use and income from said estate so long as Lizzie Rice,
his present wife, remains as his legal wife, but in case of her death or
in case of a legal separation and divorce from my said son, I then give,
devise and bequeath to my said son and to his heirs and assigns forever,
said above mentioned interest in my estate."
Later clauses provided that the son should forfeit his interest in the
income if he attempted to transfer it and directed the executors to sell
all real estate and reinvest within seven years. The son died a month
after the testator, still living with his wife Lizzie. The court held that
the condition regarding the wife being precedent it made no difference
whether it was contrary to public policy. The condition not having
been performed, the fee did not pass to the son under the will. Although the condition in question was the one which related to marriage
rather than the one which restrained alienation, the decision is significant for purposes of the law of restraints on alienation because it indicates that a restraint, although illegal, will be effective if so imposed as
to be a condition precedent to the vesting of a future interest.

Watkins v. Minor 92 was a suit for specific performance of an option. Elizabeth Minor conveyed land in fee simple to her son Clarence,
his estate to commence at her death, by a deed providing, "said second
party is not to convey or encumber said property during the lifetime of
said first party." Clarence, during his mother's lifetime, gave the option
391176 Mich. 654, 143 N.W. 39 (1913). The case involved real estate only. There
is dictum in Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich. 601 at 603, 146 N.W. 208 (1914), that
when an illegal condition precedent, interfering with the marriage relationship, is annexed
to a bequest of personal property, only the condition is void and the bequest is effectve as

if there had been no condition. The Restatement of Property applies the rule of the
Dusbiber case, as to conditions precedent which are illegal for some other reason than as
restraints on alienation, to both real and personal property. §424, comment d; §425, comment h; §426, comment e; §427, comment f; §428, comment l; §429, comment j; §433,
comment f (1944). Both the rule laid down by Conant v. Stone and that of the Restatement are criticized in Browder, "illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of illegality,"
47 Mi:cH. L. RBv. 759-774 (1949).
892214 Mich. 308, 183 N.W. 186 (1921). Technically the interest conveyed to
Clarence was a springing use. Note 386 supra. Whatever it should be called under our
statutes, they clearly permit the creation of such an interest. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §24,
note 257 supra.
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in question and the mother was alive during the pendency of this suit
to enforce it. A decree for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground the
restraint on alienation was void. The court relied upon lvlandlehaum
393
11. McDonell,
using language indicating that every restraint on alienation of an indefeasibly vested future estate in fee simple, whether by
way of prohibition or of penalty, is void. The case is significant in es-·
tablishing that all such restraints are void, even though so worded as not
to be operative after the estate becomes possessory.
Portage Grange No. 16 11. Portage Lodge No. 3403 94 is clearly wrong
and ought to be overruled. Disregarding it entirely and giving full
scope to the opinion in Mandlehaum v. McDonell395 it is possible
to sum up the Michigan law of restraints on alienation of legal interests in expectancy as follows: Every prohibitory restraint on an otherwise alienable interest in expectancy, designed to compel the owner of
the interest to remain such in spite of his efforts to rid himself of it, is
void. All penalty restraints on alienation of indefeasibly vested estates
in expectancy are void, even though so phrased as to be operative only
while the estate remains non-possessory, unless a similar restraint on a
like possessory estate would be valid. Penalty restraints on contingent
interests in expectancy, so phrased as j:o be conditions precedent to the
vesting of the interest and to terminate on the vesting of the interest are
probably valid, even though the expectant interest is in fee simple. 396
Whether penalty restraints on alienation of expectant interests in fee
which are vested subject to open or subject to divestment, remains undecided. Doubt exists as to whether a penalty restraint on a contingent
or defeasibly vested interest in expectancy, so phrased as to remain operative after the interest becomes indefeasibly vested, is valid in part, as
to the period before the interest vests indefeasibly. Upon principle,
restraints of the types described in the last two sentences should be held
to be invalid, unless a similar restraint upon a present possessory interest would be valid.
To he concluded.
303 Note 382 supra.
394 Note 387 supra.
395 Note 382 supra.
396 It should be borne

in mind that the Michigan statutory definitions of vested and
contingent interests may not be wholly in accord ·with the common law rules of distinction
between such interests. I SIMEs, FUTURE INTERllsTs §89 (1936); Roberts, "Transfer of
Future Interests,'' 30 MrcH. L. REv. 349 at 350-351 (1932).

